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ABSTRACT
^®^isionist Criticism of John D6wey*s
Theory of Schooling
September, 1980
Donald Henry Benander, A.B., Harvard University
Ed. D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Louis Fischer
This dissertation shows that criticism of John Dewey by the
^3'dical revisionists, Clarence Karier, Walter Feinberg, Samuel Bowles,
and Herbert Gintis, is based upon a misunderstanding of Dewey's
social philosophy. In their criticism, founded upon the "new history"
of the late 1960s and 1970s, they rely upon a version of liberalism
that was typical of the 1940s and 1950s. They fail to recognize the
ways in which Dewey, writing in the 1920s and 1930s, espoused a
version of liberalism that included the social reconstructionists and
many of the radicals of that time. While it may be true that many of
the spokesmen of liberalism contemporary with Dewey held the same
lalssez faire views which the radical revisionists criticize, Dewey
himself shared many of their radical beliefs.
The dissertation examines the specific criticisms made of
Dewey by the authors mentioned. It identifies the major elements
of philosophy or ideology in which both Dewey and the revisionists
are writing, and assesses the 'problems of modern liberalism which the
iv
revisionists are legitimately addressing. The conclusion of the
dissertation is that while the revisionists have raised pertinent
objections to liberalism in general, they have misrepresented many
of Dewey’s views and have overlooked important elements of a
constructive social philosophy that were central to his work.
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THE BEGINNINGS OF RADICAL CRITICISM
OF DEWEY AND SCHOOLING
The Origin of Revisionism In the Progressive Education Movement
The Progressive Education Movement, in the view of Lawrence
Cremin, represented people with a diverse collection of views,
including the radical reformers of Dewey’s time, as well as their
opponents. The rise and decline of the movement, with its internal
factions, encompassed both the views of Dewey and those radicals who
challenged his educational and social theories. In his survey of
Progressivism Cremin maintains that although the movement began as one
of protest, its character changed to reform. The reform phase had
three distinguishable concerns: child centered education, social
reform, and adoption of scientific measurement and testing. By 1950
in the conservative reaction after World War II, the movement collapsed
from the break-up of the political coalition that had supported it.
In the Genius of American Education Cremin argued that
Ptogressivism failed because the locus of control of education had
moved out of the schools into other institutions such as the mass
media, where attitudes and values of the young were being more
forcefully formed. The free school movement, he said, was a revival
of Progressivism, related to the first two of the earlier concerns,




2A. S. Neill’s Summerhill, the first of the free school
publications, was published in 1960 but received little attention at
first. In the mid 1960s writings of John Holt, Herbert Kohl, George
Dennison, James Herndon, and Jonathan Kozol added fuel to the fire of
criticism of public schools. With these writers, the free school
movement took shape as a coalition of diverse interests. It closely
united the black and ethnic groups seeking economic and political
self-determination with a white, middle-class, group which was more
apolitical. Cremin cites the early issues of the quarterly Socialist
Revolution as blending the concerns for child centered education and
schools as a lever for radical social change.
^
Although the free school movement itself was not known for its
radical politics, some elements of it, particularly minority groups,
turned to confrontation methods. At the same time, writers like
Ivan Illich extended the earlier literature critical of public
schooling to call for the abolition of all schooling. The radical
revisionists, therefore, may be see to have some historical connection
to the free school movement.
The concern for school as a lever for social change, Cremin
notes, had changed from the time of the Progressive educators. Then
it was the conservatives who wanted to abolish public schools,
and
radicals who supported public schooling. With the work of writers




The group known as the radical revisionists began with the
publication of Michael Katz's The Irony of Early School Reform (1968)
which received wide attention for Its attempt to frame research
questions In terms of the possibility that crucial decisions In
shaping of the Institutional structures of education may have been
made by elite political groups.
Other historians pursued this line of Interpretation as Illus-
trated by Clarence Karler's collection of articles In Roots of
Crisis (1972), Colin Greer's The Great School Legend (1972), and
Joel Spring's Education and the Rise of the Corporate State (1972).
Building on the work of the revisionist historians, writers from
other disciplines who shared the political outlook continued the
criticism of the liberal view of schooling. Walter Felnberg, an
educational philosopher, wrote Reason and Rhetoric; The Intellectual
Foundations of Twentieth Century Liberal Educational Policy (1975),
examining the philosophical problems of the liberal educators and
critiquing their philosophical assumptions. Samuel Bowles and
Herbert Glntls, radical economists, relying on the historical
work of Michael Katz, wrote Schooling In Capitalist America (1976),
examining the economic basis of public education In training labor
for the economic sector.
The response to revisionist history was vigorous. On the
one hand a number of historians who were sympathetic to the social
Aconcerns of revisionism or who tried to remain ideologically neutral,
produced several works focusing on urban education: Marvin Lazerson,
The Origin of Urban Schools (1971), Karl Kaestle, The Historical
Evolution of the Urban School (1973)
,
and David Tyack, The One Best
System (1974) . On the other hand some historians opposed the
revisionists, and wrote from a point of view more sympathetic to
traditional liberalism. Diane Ravitch wrote The Great School Wars of
New York: 1805-1973 (1974)
,
and Lawrence Cremin wrote The
Transformation of the School (1972). Rush Welter had written
Popular Education and Democratic Thought in America (1962) , and
continued to write reviews critical of the revisionists.
Some of the revisionists, particularly, Karier, Feinberg,
and Bowles and Gintis, traced the criticism they had of liberal views
of school to the works of John Dewey. Dewey was a major figure of
political liberalism in America, and a key figure in the philosophy
of education. Since Progressive Education was the dominant movement
in education in the early half of this century, and Dewey was
associated with it, they argued that the problems with the schools
today should be tracable to Dewey’s work.
While they acknowledged that the connection between Dewey
and liberalism and current problems in schooling cannot be stated
so simply, They believed that there was something wrong with saying
that the present difficulties of the schools were the result of the
failure of educators to live up to the high standards that Dewey
had
5set for liberal education. Their explanation took, two directions.
The first was to try to show that Dewey did teach that schools should
stress the exercise of authority by teachers and administrators, and
that he did try to legitimize the schools’ social control over students.
They argued that he did not have an adequate respect for democratic
procedure, or respect for the uneducated population. He feared and
resented the growing immigrant population, they said, and its
threat to established authority, and viewed the schools as the
primary institution for socializing the lower class to prevent
revolutionary unrest.
The second tack the revisionists took in their critique of
Dewey was to say that even though many of his statements were in
favor of egalitarian ideals, his actions showed that his intent was
different. The main evidence they used was a study Dewey wrote for
the War Department in 1918 on the Polish community in Philadelphia.
The revisionists argued that Dewey showed elitist intolerance of
minority rights in this report. They also appealed to comments in
his private letters that suggested that he harbored racist and
elitist personal views.
The revisionist writers chosen for this paper were the only
ones who addressed their attention to the work of Dewey in
any:
extended way. They are, however, typical of the range of
revisionist
liters, and their work has received public attention on a
scale
comparable with their colleagues. The chart shown in
Table 1 is a
summary
,
indicating the number of times these authors have been
cited in all the journals covered by The Social Sciences Citation
6
Index for the given years. The numbers for Bowles and Gintls are
higher than the others since they publish in economics journals as
well as in educatioal literature. From the table it is apparent that
the authors chosen for this paper are cited by their colleagues at a
comparable level with some of the best known writers in the same
area in education, and that it was in the period of 1971 to 1975 that
their work received the most attention.
Issues of Revisionism
Some of the issues central to the revisionist critique are
summarized in Christopher Hum’s The Limits and Possibilities of
Schooling . Here it is suggested that the 1950s and 1960s were a
period of expansion both in funding and attendance in public schools.
As the schools began to feel the end of the expansion in the late
1960s and early 1970s, reformers' expectations were disappointed.
Particularly in the area of eradicating poverty, but also with
respect to reducing racial and ethnic segregation, large investments
in public schools could not be justified by measurable improvements.
ks a consequence, explanations for failure were sought in alternative
theories of schooling.
According to Hum, liberal theories of schooling, which he
calls "functional theories", are based on three assumptions. The










8in economic terms is and ought to be related to the talents of
individuals. Ability and effort count for more than privilege and
inherited status. While there is improvement that can yet be made
in this country, to a great extent we have achieved meritocracy.
Schools do identify individuals with talent, and these are the ones
who are in fact rewarded with status and prestige in economic terms.
The second principle is that since society requires
increasingly specialized skills, and relies on ever more sophisticated
application of information to diverse areas, schools must be respon-
sible for training individuals with appropriate cognitive skills.
Schools not only increase the quantity of new information available
for use in economic enterprises, but train large numbers of people
in the basic cognitive skills as well as more limited numbers in the
more specialized skills.
The third principle of the functional model or "paradigm" of
liberal schooling is that society is moving toward increasingly
democratic and egalitarian social arrangements. Education reduces
intolerance and prejudice, and creates support for expansion of civil
rights. Citizens are more economically secure, and more able to
defend individual rights against authoritarian abuse. Fulfillment
of individual aspirations is therefore increasingly possible.
By way of contrast. Hum sees the revisionist views reflected
in what he calls the "radical paradigm." On the
basis of a number
of studies that indicate that predictions
based on the functional
9paradigm could not be sustained, the radicals suggest a different
model of society. Rather than a functional model in which the
elements work together to achieve a harmonious integration, they sug-
gest a conflict model in which various segments of society struggle
against one another to produce a precarious balance of forces. Rather
than view society as progressing toward greater equality and demo-
cratic control, they see the politically dominant elites increasing
their autocratic control. Capitalism characterizes the economic
system, exploiting the social order to bring poverty and unemployment,
and the natural order to bring ecological disaster. Discrimination
in the form of racism and sexism are seen as integral to the control
exercised by capitalism, since the inculcation of prejudice helps
divide and conquer the working class.
The implication of the radical paradigm for schooling is that
present social conditions are not an example of the failure of
liberalism, but of its success. Schools are in the control of econom-
ic forces and are used to perpetuate the control of the capitalist
elite. The actual content of the curriculum is "hidden." It is
to
teach passivity, self-discipline, and submissive attitudes
and
behavior. Middle class morality, competition, and "good"
work habits
are used to subvert independent thought and personal
growth. A
passive and compliant worker is the genuine product
of the educational
system. Rather than promote reform, schools
reinforce the inequality
already prevalent in the system. The radical
paradigm is a summary of
10
the revisionists’ general position on schooling.
Hum presents these models as a framework to discuss a number
of sociological studies on schooling, and to indicate how the research
questions were framed in response to ideological presuppositions.
Martin Carnoy and Henry Levin present a similar view of the revision-
ist position from the point of view of educational economics. In their
work. The Limits of Educational Reform
,
their argument is that the
characteristic feature of liberal views of education is that reform
of the schools can have a significant effect on reform of larger
society. Given the character of the economic system under which we
live, they say, there is little possibility that anything that the
educational system does can change the conditions of poverty or
economic inequality, since these problems are functions of the
economic system itself. Schools reflect rather than cause economic
inequality. Since reform must come by economic changes, those
reformers who believed that changes in the educational system would
be effective were at best naive, and in their practical effect,
misleading, since the result was not reform but support for the
established power of the economic elite. While there is nothing wrong
with giving more and better schooling to the poor, it does not solve
the problem of poverty, since it merely rotates the identity of the
group that is poor, without changing the relationship of poor to rich.
In fact, schools are an integrated part of the capitalist
system.
11
The solution Carnoy and Levin propose is to change the
structure of work, and thereby to dismantle the system of capitalism.
At some points they suggest that a "sudden” change may be the best,
but the aim is to substitute participatory democratic procedures in
the workplace, and to allow education to make itself more democratic
in response to a new set of economic arrangements. This is the
economic version of educational revisionism.
The only author who has dealt with the revisionists in
education in a full length book has been Diane Ravitch in her
Revisionists Revised . She distinguishes two revisionist trends in the
historiography of American education in the 1960s. The first of these
revisionist trends examined the Progressive-liberal tradition in a
critical light, noting events and conditions that ran counter to the
accepted ideals. Leaders of this group were Bernard Bailyn and
Lawrence Cremin. She describes the second group as follows;
"The second trend, reflecting a growing impatience with
the pace of social change in the United States,
undertook not merely a reassessment of liberalism, but
a repudiation of it. Referred to as radical revisionism,
it outspokenly declared its ideological and political
attachments, and relentlessly castigated Progressives
and liberals for reforming the American state without
fundamentally altering it." 2
She lists as the representatives of the radical revisionists: Michael
Katz, Clarence Karier, Joel Spring, Colin Greer, Samuel Bowles,
Herbert Gintis, and Walter Feinberg. She views as the defining
characteristic of revisionism a repudiation of liberalism and its
attitude toward public schooling. Public schooling was an extension
12
of the coercive power of the state, a sorting device undergirding the
exploitative class system, and a mechanism to reinforce discrimination
against various minorities.
Both revisionist trends have used new data sources for their
historical research, like computer analysis of population statistics,
and have emphasized the need to study the performance of educational
agencies as well as their rhetoric. They have championed the interest
of the poor, and brought to light institutional bias toward various
minorities. While the first revisionist trend exposed the narrowness
of educators' concern with schooling to the exclusion of the
educational effect of other social institutions, the radical
revisionists continued to be absorbed in the institutional history
like the older historians. The clearest difference between the two
kinds of revisionists, however, says Ravitch, is in their ideology
and politics. The radicals contend, that schools were consciously
designed to be undemocratic, and were intended to be instruments of
elitist social control. To corroborate this conclusion, she quotes
Marvin Lazerson, who writes that the radical revisionists believe
"that our educational failures are neither accidental
nor mindless, but endemic, built into the system as part
of its raison d'etre. For these historians, schools in
America have acted to retain the class structure by
molding the less favored to the dominant social order.
They are designed to repress blacks and other non-white
minorities while enhancing the growth of a professional
establishment." ^
Ravitch identifies a number of themes that she finds
Schools in general reflect
representative of the radical revisionists.
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class differences, so that as an institution, schooling is the effort
of the middle class, or rich, to control the lower class, or poor.
Efforts to reform the schools or to expand schooling to include more
of the population were not aimed at equality, but at extending the
authority and control of the middle class. It was similarly the case
with extension of schooling to immigrant populations. The diversity
of cultural groups was seen to threaten the control of the white,
middle class, leaders. The aim of schooling for immigrants was not
upward mobility, but assimilation to the lower ranks of the existing
economic order. While many of the immigrants accepted schooling as
a means to economic advancement, they were misled by "The Great
School Legend." The administration of public schools by bureaucracies
did not serve democratic ends, but efficiency in the interest of
elitist control. The elite was a capitalist leadership who succeeded
in making the schools a training program for their own labor needs.
While Ravitch acknowledges that this view of schooling
has led to fruitful research in the history of education, she suggests
that revisionists share three "analytical devices which need re
examination. The first is a "sort of social and economic determinism."
There is a tendency to draw conclusions about historical events or
characters on the basis of a theoretical interpretation of social
class
An example of this may be Karier's suggestion that because
Dewey and
his family derived a portion of their income from
investments in the
stock market, he vas a capitalist and could be
expected to regard the
1
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Polish-American community as a pool of cheap labor rather than as
citizens with civil rights that deserved protection.
A second analytic device which she Identifies is the idea that
there is an easy correlation between the effect of a policy and its
original purpose. She calls this a type of functionalist sociology,
and suggests that such a method of analysis relieves the historian of
the need to show the connection between Intentions and outcomes even
though such a connection is most critically significant in historical
analysis. If schools turned out to be oppressive, for example, it is
assumed that those who originally created them Intended this result.
If Dewey supported entry of the United States into the First World
War, and the result was a greater oppression of the poor in this
country by a new coalition of business and government, then Dewey
must have intended a kind of state capitalism, regardless of his
stated intentions.
The third device is the assumption of a parallelism of
structure and purpose in institutions. If schools are organized
bureaucratically, the structure is meant to maximize control from the
top, and to minimize democratic political participation. There is a
direct link between racial and ethnic discrimination and the
bureaucratic structure of schools. While Ravitch admits that such
a congruence of purpose and structure may be true, it is not
necessary, and indeed, poses the question to be answered, not the
15
solution.
Although committed to the democratic, liberal view, Ravitch
does see the work of the radical revisionists in the context of
larger issues that are as yet unresolved. She rejects the revisionist
claim that upward social mobility is a myth in America, and that the
public schools have failed to deliver on their promise of economic
advancement. Her conclusion is that there is evidence for the
reality of upward mobility, and that it is not clear exactly what
the relation of schooling is to it. Nevertheless, she puts this
difference of opinion in the context of a discussion of equality
in more general terms. She considers whether the radicals have not
set up an artificial contradiction between equal opportunity and
equal wealth. She sees public policy as reflecting a concern for
both, and in so doing, accurately representing public attitudes.
She argues that too doctrinaire an emphasis on egalitarianism
leads to the sacrifice of other values that historically the public
has not been willing to make. The objection traditionally raised
to redistribution of wealth has been that it would require the
kind of authoritarian control that most people, including the
revisionists, reject. The need for constant monitoring and re-
adjustment would entrench a bureaucratic class that would eliminate
private initiative and freedom. On the other hand, it is not
clear how such equality could happen without damaging
productivity.
far has not generated confidence in the publicEconomic planning so
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that it would not itself become another special interest, or that it
could improve on present levels of productivity. The revisionists'
contention, then, appears to be a one-sided solution that could upset
a present balance of Interests that is not in principle a bad one.
The revisionists have enriched the study of educational history
during the past fifteen years by their introduction of new methods
of historical research as well as by their radical Ideological
perspective. Their provocative challenge to accepted views of
schooling and the policies used to direct the course of its develop-
ment have generated a great deal of new research, as well as
controversy about principles and values. It has led to a reconsider-
ation of the work of Dewey on educational philosophy and the role
of schooling, and brought to light the need for experimental
verification of the programs of liberalism. It is in the interest
of a critical reappraisal of Dewey's work as an example of liberal
views of schooling that we now turn to the radical revisionists'
writing on this topic.
CHAPTER II
CLARENCE KARIER;
DEWEY'S LIBERALISM AND THE BETRAYAL OF THE INDIVIDUAL
Introduction
Karier's work is in the tradition of the History of Ideas. His
method is to identify alternative conceptual points of view or
"ideologies", and to interpret any given historical era as a balance,
if not a resolution, of the countervailing views under the influence
of the economic and political conditions of the times. His book,





history in the last century as an encounter between "classical
humanism" ,with its emphasis on the individual in a natural and
supernatural setting, and "humanitarianism" , with its emphasis on
social progress in a naturalist context. Those whom Karier calls
Neo—Conservatices and Fascists took the views of humanism and adapted
them to an aggressive political program, while social reconstructionists
and Marxists did the same for the humanitarian ideology. The present
state of affairs in education reflects this conflict.
The book itself ends only with Karier's descriptive account
of the two competing ideologies, leaving the implication that some
Hegelian synthesis of the two views is emerging in the contemporary
era. No hint of it is given in the book, however, and no
statement




synthesis may be from Karier's subsequent writings.
In 1969 Karier published an article entitled Humanltas and the
Triumph of the Machine in which he underlined the importance of
what he called the "humanist" position in his own point of view.^
In this article he argues that while the twentieth century saw the
triumph of the "humanitarian" ideology, "this freedom of the anthill
represents that side of the liberal enlightenment ... (which) rather
easily sacrificed the autonomy of the individual for the good of an
2
orderly society." Two points in this connection are worth making,
one with regard to Karier's view of Dewey, and one about Karier's own
position.
Concerning Dewey, Karier argues that although Dewey did have
an appreciation for the moral worth of the individual, he seemed not
to understand the conflict of interest between the individual and
society, and to Karier Dewey appeared to be straddling the fence.
Karier xjrites that Dewey, in his affirmation of individual rights,
was "living off the moral capital of the past." "Dewey erred," it
seems, "when he looked at science and technology and saw his own
values rather than an amoral instrument of intelligence which could
. m3
just as easily be used to destroy his 'humane age' as to achieve it.
Karier claims that Dewey's hope for a "scientific, humane, individual-
ism" has not become a reality, and the implication is that the
concern of "humanism" to assert the rights of the individual
against
society should be reaffirmed.
19
As far as Karier's own position is concerned, it appears that
he sees humanism as losing out to humanitarianism, and requiring
Karier s own committment to the humanist camp. As he moves toward the
humanists, he regards Dewey as a humanitarian rather than a mediator
between the two positions, as he tended to see him earlier. Karier
now feels the necessity to reassert the humanist committment to
moral standards validated by a non-naturalist metaphysic.
In 1969 Karier moved from Rochester to the University of
Illinois at Champagne-Urbana
,
where his writing became more strongly
critical of Dewey. We can infer from his work a developing synthesis
of the earlier positions described by Karier as emerging from
antagonistic ideologies. He is concerned primarily to assert the
moral worth of the individual against social views that seem to subject
individuals to the power of the state. He believes that the moral
values of the humanist tradition must be reaffirmed against pragmatism.
He claims that democratic political procedures must be maintained
to protect the political equality of individuals, and that education
should emphasize liberal arts training to reinforce these values.
Nevertheless, his interest in individualism rejects the elitist social
views of Classical Humanism, and favors a pluralistic, indeed, a
class conflict, theory of society. There is a hightening sense of
moral urgency in his view of the social crisis, which attracts him to
radical political solutions, so that he can speak of "the battle
of the streets" and "revolution" as immanent threats. But there
is
no suggestion that he advocates militaristic or violent social
action as a political solution. His aim, as stated in the Humanitas
S’^ticle, is a free man in a free society.*' If this slogan has the
ring of the nineteenth century liberal to it, it is no surprise. It
means resistance to strongly centralized social organization, denial
that the destructive force of institutions can be controlled to
serve humane ends, rejection of technology, and strengthening of the
role of humanists as effective social critics.
Karier's Critique of Dewey
While Karier supported those features of Dewey’s thought that
affirmed the rights of the individual against domination by social
forces, he objected to those elements that seemed to work against this
end. He objected to Dewey's pragmatic treatment of values, which
seemed to remove the legitimate authority of traditional values and
standards. He opposed Dewey's view of technology as a generally
positive benefit to individual happiness and freedom. Because he
thought Dewey advocated social control of individuals as a legitimate
educational and political end, he believed that Dewey was not really
committed to individualism in terms of political equality or
participatory democracy. He viewed Dewey as uncommitted to minority
rights for blacks and immigrants. He rejected liberalism because he
saw it as a term for a social program to implement the views of Dewey
to which he objected, and he resisted Progressive Education as Dewey'
design for a school system to inculcate his views through public
21
schooling. He believed that Dewey developed a contrived view of
history to support corporate capitalism, and that he tried to
undermine the power of the oppressed to resist political domination.
Pragmatism and the erosion of values . Karier maintains that Dewey's
work on the development of a pragmatic ethical theory damaged the
authority of traditionally established values, and led to open
disregard for principled behavior among public figures. While Karier
does not discuss Dewey's ethical writings themselves, his main
evidence for this criticism is a series of articles Dewey wrote,
mainly, in the New Republic
,
discussing the entry of the United
States into the First World War, and Dewey's attitude toward pacifists.
Randolph Bourne's criticism of Dewey is quoted as evidence of Dewey's
lack of a stable position on moral issues, and his proclamation of
efficiency of "technique" as a primary value.
^
Karier argues that Dewey, along with Herbert Croly, Walter
Lippman, and the other editors of the New Republic naively believed
that by supporting American entry into the First World War, the
government could be strengthened against the industrial sector. Thereby
intellectuals could bring pressure on business to surrender its
committment to private profit, and to serve a broader social interest.
In Karier' s view, when this course of action for the liberals was
opposed by the pacifists, the ethical emptiness of their position
became evident. According to Karier, Dewey argued for the liberals
22
that a priori claims, such as the pacifists' claim for the absolute
prohibition of war, were invalid, and that they ought rather to
acknowledge the overwhelming opposition to their position, and seek
the most practical accommodation possible. He went on to say that
the use of force, or even violence, may represent an intelligent
utilization of energy. Karier says.
This, then, was the cognitive process by which Dewey and many
liberal intellectuals justified the use of force while at the
same time avoiding the analysis of the political forces which
realistically control the ends. Thus ends in themselves were
depoliticized as they became methodological problems. Although
Dewey clearly rejected the older ethical tradition which held
as a priori certain principles, his use of the term efficiency
as a methodological criterion of judgment in this context
^
seemed to function almost as an a priori principle in itself.
Karier quotes Bourne's criticism of Dewey; "But there was
always that unhappy ambiguity in his doctrine as to just how values
were created."^ Karier believes that the role of the intellectual
ought to be one of value creator for society, and that it is this
prophetic role that Dewey failed to fulfill.
The role of liberalism in a capitalistic society. While Dewey seemed
to see himself as an advocate of a kind of industrial democracy against
private capitalism, Karier maintains that opposition to capitalism
was neither Dewey's intention nor effect. In fact, he was in favor of
the economic status quo, and his writings sought to work out a way
to accommodate social change with a minimum of disruption, and
g
v>rithout alteration of existing authority structures.
Intellectuals
23
who formulated the liberal point of view did so openly seeking the
recognition and acceptance of those in positions of power in business
and government. This claim is documented by the support of intellec-
tuals for the war effort in 1917, by the willingness of those in the
educational testing movement to serve industrial needs, and by the
submissiveness of university faculties and administrations to the
9interests of donors of large sums of money to their schools.
The role of liberals, such as Dewey, as servants of estab-
lished political and economic power is also reflected, Karier argues,
in their concern for social control and their fear of social conflict.
Dewey is viewed as a representative of the white, middle class, whose
concern for social organization is a device to protect his own class
interest and the system which produced the status he enjoyed.
Dewey's opposition to a class conflict theory of society is seen as
a denial of the need to resist violence so that the oppressed may
not realize the extent of their own influence. Dewey's attempt to
formulate a "positive" concept of freedom is seen as a license to
government for totalitarian control of citizens and a service to the
... 10
newly emerging "managed corporate economy" of American capitalism.
Science and technology as a new theology . Karier traces the waning
vitality of Protestantism to its confrontation with Darwinism and
with higher Biblical criticism, and argues that the doctrines
of
organized religion lost their credibility as Americans
searched for
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an alternative. They turned to the "Social Gospel" of Walter
Rauchenbush and Jane Addams. John Dewey, in Karier's view, with his
devotion to science, was a spokesman for the new religious ideology.
To Dewey, as to many who followed him, science and technology were
the new theology. All was tied to a quest for 'The Great Community'
where men would ultimately learn, as Dewey put it, 'to use their
scientific knowledge to control their social relations
. Karier
interprets Dewey's vision as "a benign faith in scientific method and
technology" which Dewey believed would lead through inevitable
12progress to a "humane age." While Karier sympathizes with the
ideal, he believes Dewey made a fatal error in not distinguishing
science and technology from the economic and political forces
controling their use. Karier says, "In the world of twentieth century
power politics, however, most scientists and technologists became
13
hired men of the industrial militarized society." Since the society
was controlled by self-seeking power elites, science and technology,
however benign, became corrupted. Dewey's failure to note the evils
of political control of science and technology, according to Karier,
made his connection of science with democracy and individual freedom
not only false, but also an appealing ideological disguise for the
actual development of authoritarian forces in American life. Dewey
is responsible, in Karier's view, for enhancing the notion that there
are experts in social science to whose authority the public must bow
in making social policy decisions.
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Individualism. Although the period of the Enlightenment had as its
impetus, Karier writes, both a concern for individual freedom and for
social harmony, as that tradition developed into twentieth century
liberalism, the first concern was lost for the sake of the second.
The collective side of that philosophy, with its scientifically
organized technology and computer-managed bureaucracy, has become
reality; on the other side, however, individual freedom, dignity,
and well-being have not fared so well. Caught up in collective
institutional progress, the individual has become a means rather
than an end to social order.
Specifically with respect to Dewey, Karier faults his idea of
"positive” freedom, which is understood as a way of getting individu-
als to submit voluntarily to the power of government, and to political
elites acting through government.
Dewey is held accountable especially in three respects. First,
he developed a concept of democracy which rejected the autonomy of the
individual as well as the proceduaral safeguards for it in democratic
theory. In Karier 's view, although Dewey affirmed the social rights
of individuals, there was no political way to assure their protection.
Karier 's analysis of the Polish study by Dewey is regarded as evidence
of Dewey's disregard for democratic procedures and the individual
rights they protect.
While Dewey claimed that science and technology could become
a powerful instrument in realizing social goals like
democracy and
individual freedom, "there is is no necessary, inherent
connection,"
says Karier, between the two. While Karier does
not say that democracy
self-evident social values, he does suggest
and individual freedom are
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that Dewey was wrong in his pragmatic rejection of a priori values,
and in suggesting that science or the method of intelligence should
become "a creator of new values and ends." He feared Dewey’s work
heralded the development of an objective science of human values.
The third respect in which Dewey is to blame for betraying the
ideal of individualism is in his educational policies. His educa-
tional views made an analogy between the social scientist as expert
and the teacher, so that a new authoritarianism could emerge in the
schools. Not only were individuals forced into schools by compul-
sory education laws, but they were subjected to a training that
convinced them that their individuality really consisted in submission
to school authorities. Says Karier, "His (Dewey's) community. . .
would necessitate a new man who found his individualism realized
in the emerging corporate community
Ideological history . Karier 's major criticism of Dewey's use of
history is that it lacked objectivity. Karier quotes material in
which Dewey describes the role of history teaching in elementary
classes, and argues that because Dewey viewed history in the context
of classroom teaching, history was given an instrumental character
which led to distortion of the past. For example, since incidents
of racial violence and domination were excluded on the grounds that
they did not contribute to confirming students' sense of responsi-
bility and control of their environment, Dewey seemed to
present a
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false image of possible social harmony to children.
Perhaps even more significant, however, was the association of
history with the idea of progress. For Dewey, says Karier, "...
the world had purpose and meaning. It remained simply to discover
the meaning and rationalized purpose, and our place in that existent
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world of work." Dewey’s adoption of the idea of progress dictated
his selection of historical material in such a way as to make his
work an apology for the status quo, and a misrepresentation of the
actual history of America. Karier says.
Economic and industrial history, which Dewey repeatedly advocated,
was the kind that emphasized the rational, intelligent story of
mankind's progressive conquest over nature. It did not emphasize
those historical experiences which reflect the irrational, the
vicious struggle of man against man, or class against class,
involved in industrial history.
Political power . Karier 's criticisms of Dewey's attitude toward
political power are summarized in his most recent article. Schooling,
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Education, and the Structure of Social Reality . Karier believes
that both Marx and Dewey envisioned a society in which institutions
could contribute to the satisfaction of individual needs. While Marx
regarded consciousness of class conflict as the means to bring about
the new society, Dewey eschewed the violence of revolution, and
advocated public education as the means for change. Karier believes
that because Dewey was committed to the interest of the exploiting
class, he was unable or unwilling to support any action which would
actually bring about the social change he envisioned. "Dewey was not
28
a radical revolutionary, but a liberal who dreamed utopian dreams
and consistently rejected radical action."
Karier, apprently siding with the Marxist position, believed
that Dewey made a fatal mistake in denying the "social reality" of
class conflict. By viewing knowledge or inquiry as a cooperative
social enterprise, and regarding "private egoism, private profit,
and class consciousness as a social nemesis," Dewey undermined the
ability of oppressed classes to assert their legitimate rights
against those who had taken them away. The notion of "a broader,
more comprehensive social interest, free of self-interest, class
interest or ideological cant," was a myth, according to Karier,
which perpetuated Dewey's own social privilege and defeated the
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very social aims he proclaimed.
The benign educational reality which Dewey constructed was an
artificial reality, divorced of selfish egoism and political
realities. It was, however, a total world view, which could
have the effect of depriving a variety of classes of the
political and social consciousness necessary to effectively
confront those in power, while at the same time offering a
religious faith in an ultimate, non-violent, resolution of a
variety of social problems.
Assessment of Karier *s Critique of Dewey
Pragmatism and the erosion of traditional values . Karier 's comments
on Dewey's pragmatism to the effect that Dewey recommended that
efficiency be substituted for traditional values is based on a
superficial reading of Dewey's ethics. It is a caricature which was
rejected by Dewey frequently during his own career. Dewey did
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recommend the application of scientific method to ethical delibera-
tion, not to arrive at values that possessed scientific objectivity
or certainty, but to provide a method of inquiry that would both
make it more likely that professed ideals be realized, and make it
clearer what ideals a person or group is committed to. There is
nothing in his ethical writings to suggest that he supported
opportunistic behavior in political life. This is exactly what he
decried.
Karier's argument is a non-sequitur in two respects. He first
argues that because Dewey opposed the pacifists in World War I,
his view of moral values must be defective. Without discussing
Dewey's arguments against the concept of fixed values in Human Nature
and Conduct or Ethics
,
Karier can only assert, but not demonstrate,
that Dewey was wrong about the nature of values. It is not self-
evident that Dewey's opposition to the pacifists was incorrect.
Dewey's claim was that while the pacifists may have been correct
that the entry of the United States into the war was wrong, it was
not so on the basis of a priori claims, but on the basis of the
consequences of the act. He encouraged them to work to achieve their
goals through effective political action.
In the second place, Karier uses an ad hominem argument to
argue that since Dewey was a member of the middle class, his ethical
theories, insofar as they support the interests of the middle class,
cannot be true. Even if, as Karier says, "Dewey's last wife was a
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'^ulti-millionaire, " his theories on the nature of values are not
thereby discredited.
Nevertheless, with respect to the more general import of
Karier's arguments about pragmatism, and its effect on principled
behavior on the part of Americans, and particularly those in public
life, Karier seems to be attributing to Dewey responsibility for
28present moral distress. Karier sees the present in terms of
moral decadence, highlighting, as he does, racism, militarism, and
class conflict, although one could just as easily Interpret it
(as Dewey does) as a transition from an age which relied on one set
of cultural beliefs and social structures to another in which the
beliefs and structures are yet to be formulated, that will enable
individuals to give moral meaning to the new conditions. Dewey
made an important contribution to the new age in his proposals
for a naturalistic ethic. Its effectiveness in dealing with con-
temporary social problems can hardly be dismissed as casually as
Karier does in equating it with opportunistic relativism.
With respect to the role of intellectuals as creators of
values in society, no doubt Dewey would agree that intellectuals
ought to be men and women of principle. However, the material
Karier adduces to show that, in the Progressive era intellectuals
ceased to be the social critics, standing for truth and integrity,
and suddenly became servants of power, does not seem historically
accurate. Thomas More, no doubt, was as much an exception
in his
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day as Karier believes he would be today. It is not Dewey's
pragmatism that is responsible for the moral decisions of the
academic community as a whole or of particular academics. Their
decisions are the product of numerous considerations, whether they
draw on Dewey's work or a distortion of it to explain themselves.
Karier is incorrect in making Dewey responsible for the subservience
of academics to government, particularly in view of Dewey's explicit
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remarks condemning such behavior.
The role of liberalism in a capitalist society . Karier 's argument
with respect to Dewey seems to be as follows: since Dewey opposed
social violence, and since the only way to change the status quo is
through violence, Dewey must have favored the status quo. Since
Dewey was a member of the middle class, and since the status quo
favored the middle class, Dewey must have favored the status quo.
It is clear that the problem with this argument is Karier' s own
assumption that social violence is the only way to change the
status quo.^^ Dewey did not agree with that; his position was a
plausible one at the time. His writings repeatedly called for
social change, and his opposition to violence was explicit.
In
Liberalism and Social Action he enumerates several arguments
against
the use of violent force to bring about social change.
First,
history records significant social changes made without
violence.
Second, warfare had so advanced in its destructive
power that it
could mean the common ruin of contending parties.
Third, arguments
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for the use of violence justify its use by claiming that it is a
last resort, since all the agencies of power are in the hands of the
economic elite. If this is so, the use of violence is all the more
absurd. Fourth, arguments for the use of violence claim that the
only alternative is to work through existing political institutions
which are ineffective. In fact, Dewey says, these institutions do
change with social pressure and circumstances, and they deserve to
be tried. Fifth, force breeds counter force; given the record of
the Russian revolution, "it is permissable to look with considerable
suspicion upon those who assert that suppression of democracy is the
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road to adequate establishment of genuine democracy.” The
alternative Dewey supports is the method of experimental intelligence.
If Dewey rejected violence as the means to bring about
social change, it was not because he did not want seriously to see
the change occur. He wrote
In short, liberalism must now become radical, meaning by "radical"
perception of the necessity of thoroughgoing changes in the
set-up of institutions and corresponding activity to bring
changes to pass. . . If radicalism be defined as perception of
the need for radical change, then today any liberalism which
is not also radicalism is irrelevant and doomed.
2
While he did not specify the political program that ought to be
pursued, he did favor a reform movement with an inclusive plan,
and
he supported actively numerous reform organizations.
Although Karier uses the term "orderly change" in a sense
that
connotes authoritarian control and domination of a subject class.
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Dewey did favor orderly change in a different sense. On the level
of the individual life, orderly control of one's environment in
order to be assured that it yield the necessities of survival was a
primary biological and social aim. At a social level, the aim of the
individual was to create and share a social setting which would
continue to support him in developing his capacity for orderly control
as well as in his effort to extend that control to broader reaches of
the environment. There was nothing inherently authoritarian about
the nature of control in Dewey's view.
This view of the individual and his primary community was
the basis of Dewey's critique of capitalist society. The production
of goods for profit created systematic frustration of individual
needs and of the ability of individuals to create and enjoy supportive
social community. In Dewey's view, larger institutions, like commerce,
industry, and government, could be reformed to make the progressive
realization of community for individual members their principal aim.
Social control, exercised in the interest of enhancing individual
control, as, for example, with more equitable laws or social
policies, did not seem to Dewey to be the same authoritarianism
that Karier implies with his concept of social control. Karier's
argument, therefore, that Dewey actually supported the status quo
because of his concern for orderly change, seems based on a
misinterpretation of the idea of orderly social change and social
control found in Dewey. If there were a nefarious power in control
1
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of institutions, systematically preventing orderly social change
or defeating egalitarian reform, Dewey did not see it. He read the
history of change as offering at least the possibility of intelligent
moral choice.
Science and technology. Two points are made by Karier in relation to
science and technology. The first is that technology cannot be a
solution to the problems of social change, as Dewey maintains, because
it involves dependence on economic resources which are controlled by
capitalists who do not want social change in the direction of greater
social equality. The second is that Dewey favored giving authority
in social policy making to an elite of scientific experts.
With regard to the first point, Dewey’s support for science
and technology was based on a much broader definition of the words
than Karier appears to use. By science Dewey meant not a body of
information about the physical world so much as the principles of
experimental inquiry. The imperative of our time, Dewey said, is that
while the method of scientific inquiry has been confined to knowledge
of the physical world, and excluded from the formulation of the ends
to which the discoveries of technology have t)een put, the formulation
of values themselves must be put to the test of experimental inquiry.
Values are empty and sentimental rather than guides to action if they
are held apart from a knowledge of their attendant physical conditions
and consequences. But when they are formulated in conjunction with
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experimental method, they are found to be in constant transition
relative to new circumstances and possibilities. Therefore,
scientific method and technology are of supreme importance. They
are not an "amoral instrument of intelligence", as Karier suggests.
Rather, they constitute the only way man can make his values a
matter of deliberate choice instead of a matter of authority, habit,
or blind impulse.
Karier, of course, is concerned because intelligence can be
used for immoral purposes, as can science and technology. Dewey is
not blind to that fact. But the mere misuse of an instrument is not
an argument against its proper use. Dewey is saying that although
science and technology have indeed been misused, they are indispen-
sible to the achievement of responsible formulation of social aims
and the realization of social values.
Basic to human survival is provision for the economic require-
ments of life. Any consideration of the morality of human conduct
must recognize that moral behavior takes for granted a human
community in which the necessities of economic security are assured.
Science and technology are the most effective instruments yet
developed to see that the economic necessities of life could be
provided in the present world. While they have not yet been put to
that end, that is the moral function that they could serve. If it
is
true, as Dewey would agree, that the proper end of science and




not be rescued from misuse.
Karler's argument, then, claims that because capitalism has
achieved unassailable control over science and technology, they can
not now be put to an acceptable social purpose. Here is where
Dewey would disagree. The evidence of the past is mixed. There have
been examples of the humane use of science and technology, and they
furnish evidence for a reasonable hope that despite the control of
capitalism, they may be used so again. Whether capitalism's control
over the resources of technology is absolute, as Karier claims, is
an empirical question that is still open.
In The Public and Its Problems Dewey considers the arguments
of those who defend the political control of the masses by an
aristocratic group of "experts". His conclusion is that such a
proposal is inconsistent with democratic government: "The man who
wears the shoe best knows that it pinches, and where it pinches,
even if the expert shoemaker is the best judge of how it is to be
remedied. But the main theme of the passage deals with the rela-
tion of the work of experts to democratic procedures. Dewey says,
"Inquiry, indeed, is a work which devolves upon experts, but their
expertness is not shown in forming and executing policies, but in
discovering and making known the facts upon which the former
depend. The suggestion by Karier that Dewey favored the
.
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political domination of citizens by scientific experts is
untrue.
Some writers, such as Christopher Hum and Mich ael Katz,
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suggests that there is an anti-democratic, authoritarian quality
built into bureaucratic structure of institutions so that officially
constituted "experts” usurp decision making no matter how demo-
cratically the organization was originally created. They argue that
there are laws of organizational behavior that inevitably require
the centralization of authority, and that this type of organization
is required by the complexity of social and economic problems
of the present.
In response to this position, Diane Ravitch says that this
argument reflects a determinism that does not represent actual
circumstances. There is no necessary relation between organizational
structure and the purposes to which the organization is put.
Historically, organizations like the public schools have been
formed for many purposes, only one of which was orderly control of
students. Even if bureaucratic organization does have a tendency to
support hierarchical authority, and to eliminate democratic
exercise of power, there is no reason to suppose that the structure
may not be used for other purposes, especially when the constituency
desires different outcomes for the organization. The move to
decentralize decision-making has been one such attempt to accommodate
bureaucratic structure to more democratic purposes.
Individualism . While it may be true that there is a great difference
between Karier's and Dewey's views on the topic of individualism,
Karier's comments fail to take into account Dewey's major works on the
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topic. Individualism Old and New
, for example, has as a major
point the contention that in terms of method, it is an error to
contrast the concept of individual with the concept of society.
The habit of opposiing corporate and collective to the individual
tends to the persistent continuation of the confusion and the
uncertainty. It detracts attention from the crucial issue:
how shall the individual refind himself in an unprecedentedly
new social situation, a^(^ what qualities will the new
individualism exhibit?
Dewey's claim is not that there are alternative kinds of individual-
ism, but that all individualism has been lost in the American social
experience, not only for the unemployed masses, but for the "captains
of industry" as well: an observation anticipating William Whyte's
Organization Man. The reason for the loss is that individualism is
constituted not by some intrinsic quality, but by a set of cultural
values and ideas supported by appropriate social arrangements which
allow a person to perceive himself and his activity as having
shared meaning and social purpose.
The difference between Karier's view of the individual and
Dewey's, which Karier perceives as a betrayal of individualism, can
be traced to an uncritical dichotomy in Karier's own thinking
between the individual and his social setting. Dewey's contribution
to the subject has been his exploration of the nature of
individualism in terms of the way various characteristics of social
life can either provide or deny to the individual those experiences
that create a sense of individuality and personal growth.
With regard to Karier’s suggestion that Dewey's concept of
positive" freedom was a screen created for the purpose of getting
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individuals to collaborate in their own subjugation, let us
examine the distinction between positive and negative freedom in
Dewey's writing.
There can be no greater mistake, however, than to treat such
freedom, (mobility or freedom of physical movement) as an
end in itself. It then tends to be destructive of the shared
cooperative activities which are the normal source of order.
But, on the other hand, it turns freedom, which should be
positive, into something negative. For freedom from restriction,
the negative side, is to be prized only as a means to a freedom
which is power; power to frame purposes, to judge wisely, to
evaluate desires by the consequences which will result from
acting upon them; power to select and' order means to carry chosen
ends into operation. 38
There is nothing in this extension of the concept of freedom from one
of absence of restraint to one of capacity to formulate and carry out
purposes that implies authoritarian control.
With regard to the suggestion by Karier that there is
something wrong with Dewey's definition of Democracy, Karier says,
"first. . . Dewey changed the meaning of terms like democracy, freedom,
and equality, and secondly, . . . the meanings of these terms might
39
best be discovered in action situations." Certainly it was true
that such terms were developed into extended concepts central to
Dewey's philosophy, and were therefore given systematic, stipulative
definition. Nevertheless, their meanings were not made contrary to
the common sense meanings of the terms, as Karier suggests. Dewey
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considered the concept of democracy principally an ethical concept
encompassing the goal of full and free growth of individual capacities
in a social community. Democratic procedures, like individual
suffrage and majority rule, were not absolute, but were useful
procedures for realizing the ethical goal of democratic life in a
given social setting. Other settings, like the family, could be
democratic without them. The task of intelligent inquiry was to
formulate whatever political devices would be necessary to realize
democratic goals in any changing social setting. It is this willingness
to consider new political forms that has disturbed Karier and led him
to fear that Dewey has surrendered too much by acknowledging the
relativity of the procedures that have been identified with democracy.
But it is clear that Dewey was in no way reducing the common sense
notion of democracy, but making a distinction intended to make its
application clearer and more effective.
Karier claims that "neither democracy nor individual freedom
had any necessary or inherent connection with science and technology."
In this view, the social relations of science and technology are
ignored. Dewey believed that there was such a connection, which was
based on his understanding of the ethical nature of democracy. In an
early work. The Ethics of Democracy , he says.
Democracy, in a word, is social, that is to say, an ethical
conception, and upon its ethical conception is based its
significance as governmental. Democracy is a form of government^^
only because it is a form of moral and spiritual association.
41
He goes on. to state the implication of such a view, saying that
because it is ethical, "democracy must become industrial." Although
traditional thinking has distinguished the spiritual from the mater-
ial aspects of life, and equated the ethical with the former but not
the latter
,
it is necessary that men come to understand the
ethical significance of every part of life.
That the economic and industrial life is in itself ethical, that
it is to be made contributory to the realization of personality
through the formation of a higher, more complete unity among men,
this is what we do not recognize. But such is of the
statement that democracy must become industrial.
In this respect, science and technology, (i.e. science as the method
of experimental intelligence and technology as the application of
the products of that inquiry to humane ends) is the instrument of
43bringing about the goal of industrial democracy. As to whether the
connection between science and technology and the purposes it should
serve were necessary and inherent, Dewey certainly observed that in
the past the connection had not been made, but he argued that there
was no reason to suppose that in the future the connection should
not be made.
It is not difficult, then, to see why Dewey could regard
science as a potential creator of new values. His major premis is
that experience is open-ended, always in the process of change. Value
are guides to action as they are applied to changing circumstances.
The more intelligently they are applied, the greater the scope of
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consequences action can encompass. Science as a method of intelli-
gent inquiry into possible ends can Improve the quality of values
inherited from tradition by modifying them to fit new circumstances
and thereby create new values for new situations. This is not to
ssy that cherished values like individualism and democracy are to
be discarded, but that they are able to be transformed to apply
to hitherto unforseen circumstances.
If Karier understands Dewey’s view of schooling as
inculcating a view of individualism that submerges personal freedom
in the aims of society, then he has not heard the constant claim of
Dewey that such is not his intention. It was Dewey’s belief that
schooling can and ought to develop the capacities of individuals in
a way that is not hostile to their social participation, but assists
others in the same development . If Karier does not see this ideal
being realized in schools today, he does not therefore demonstrate
the error of Dewey’s objective of a non-competitive individualism.
Ideological history . Karier ’s critique of Dewey on the topic of his-
tory lies in Dewey’s tendency to use it for what appears to Karier
as the wrong political purpose. Karier would prefer to see history
used to raise popular class consciousness so that individuals are
sensitized to political oppression, and are willing to resist
aribtrary authority. He sees Dewey as selecting historical material
in such a way as to depoliticize students and general readers, and
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appealing to motives which defuse a sense of anger at political
injustice.
Karier is correct in observing that Dewey uses history for a
different purpose from his own, but he is mistaken in his idea of
what Dewey is doing with history and why he is doing it. Karier
cites Charles S. Peirce's comment on Dewey's work, Studies in Logical
Theory
,
but he misunderstands Dewey's point and Peirce's as well.^^
Karier says.
For Dewey, the very nature of logic itself was historically
determined. It was this point which led Charles S. Peirce
to critically review Dewey's Studies in Logic and suggest that
Dewey and his followers seemed to have confused logic with a
natural history of thought.
This is not what Peirce said in his review, where, instead of making
a negative criticism of Dewey, he praised him for his innovation.
Peirce writes, "He (Dewey) seemes to regard what he calls 'logic' as
a natural history of thought. If such a natural history can be
worked out, it will undoubtably form valuable knowledge, and with all
our heart we wish the Chicago school godspeed in their enterprise of
, . M 46discovery.
Karier then goes on to quote from Dewey's 1938 Logic: A Theory
of Inquiry . In this volume Dewey says that in contrast to the view
of Absolute Idealism that logical forms have an a priori validity,
logical forms can be shown to emerge from the process of inquiry
which occurs in experience. Correspondingly, historical forms




existential context in which the history is written.
The implication of Dewey’s claim is that there is no absolute
context in which a definitive history can be written, but a multitude
of contexts for different histories. If Karier objects to the
selection of historical events Dewey makes, it is not because there
is some absolute, finite collection, the true character of which
Dewey has disguised, but because the criteria of selection are
different for Dewey and Karier. Karier is concerned that the
criteria be that the events chosen motivate the reader to challenge
unjust treatment of individuals and minorities by legally appointed
authorities. Dewey is concerned about this objective, but he is also
concerned with developing an attitude and habit of inquiry with
respect to social issues. As he mentions in Racial Prejudice and
Friction , with many social problems, the temptation is to
invest more effort in condemning the evil than in inquiry as to the
definition of the problem and in finding an effective solution. For
this reason Dewey sees the context of historical writing as inquiry
into social policy formation.
Karier ’s own concern seems to be less a question of historical
method, then, than a plea for moral indignation, and for less of
the emotional neutrality of inquiry when it comes to issues
of
potentially inflammatory public interest. He is probably correct
that
since the social context has changed since the time Dewey
wrote.
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certain social issues deserve more serious concern than Dewey thought
they did. But Karier's interest would be served better by focusing
on the present situation than on a critique of Dewey's historiography.
First, it is not true that Dewey held the uncritical view of
social progress attributed to him by Karier. The central contention
of his experimentalism was that the future course of events was open,
and that its successful or disasterous outcomes could not be
predicted. The outcome depended on the intelligent exercise of
responsible choice in the present. Dewey explicitly says that primi-
tive man was not less endowed with moral sentiment than modern man.
So in terms of moral sentiments, there is no "progress". There has
been a development in the social occasions and channels to express
those sentiments, however. Dewey says.
The problem which now confronts us, the problem of progress, is
the same in kind (as developing technology in natural sciences)
but differing in subject matter. It is a problem of discovering
the needs and capacities of collective human nature as we find
it aggregated' in racial or national groups on the surface of
the globe, and of inventing the social machinery which will
available powers operating for the satisfaction of those needs.
Political power. Karier's most recent criticism of Dewey is framed
in terms of political power: Dewey's social analysis concealed the
fact of political conflict and its role in social change. In so doing
he effectively supported the existing power structure to the
disadvan-
tage of the subject classes, including students in educational
settings.
A6
To begin with, it is not accurate to say that Dewey concealed
the fact of political conflict or its role in social change. There
are ample references to the presence of political conflict in his
but he held that the mere fact of conflict was secondary to the
discovery of the nature of the conflict and the means of resolving it.
In fact, all political activity was of secondary nature to social and
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economic activity. In the view of those who have investigated
Dewey’s political theory, however, Karier may be correct in focusing
on the analysis of power in Dewey’s political theory.
George Raymond Geiger, writing in 1939 about "Dewey’s Social
and Political Philosophy," noted that in the context of the social
crisis at the start of the second World War, the atmosphere of social
emergency raised questions about specific political choices which
Dewey’s instrumentalism seemed not to address: how could democratic
tolerance be granted to those who would destroy it? How could a
liberal social philosophy, which values reflective doubt and explor-
ation, act decisively in a crisis? What kind of resources for
.
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motivation can be derived from making intelligence a priority:
In reviewing Dewey’s work from the point of view of a political
scientist, A.H.Somjee in 1967 recognizes that Dewey made a notable
contribution to the theory of political science with his The Public
and its Problems in 1938. Its major contribution was its suggestion
for a conceptual framework with which to analyse political phenomena.
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as well as his substitution of interactional models for traditional
absolutist concepts. Nevertheless, as much as Dewey stressed the
concept of political power, he tended to subsume the idea of control
of political phenomena under the idea of control of phenomena in
scientific inquiry generally. In Somjee's view Dewey’s political
theory was weakened by a lack of attention to specifically political
types of control that could be possible and desirable.
This criticism reflects less of a problem with Dewey's theory
than a direction for its extension. Yet, if Karier’s concern for
more explicit treatment of the role of political power in Dewey’s
work includes a desire to see the ways that theory can be effectively
applied to the critical issues of the present, his critique would be
a useful addition to the legacy of Dewey's work, as well as a
contribution to scholarship.
In general, then, Karier does not adequately distinguish Dewey’s
work from that of other liberals, as Charles Forcey and Morton White
are careful to do. It does not distinguish the ideological issues
that lie behind his differences with Dewey, and relies too heavily
on dialectical contrast of poorly defined concepts like "humanism"
and "humanitarianism." Nevertheless, he has a sense of urgency about
dealing with contemporary issues in education and social policy. A
more careful reading of Dewey would help him realize that objective.
CHAPTER III
WALTER FEINBERG:
DEIJEY'S LIBERALISM AND THE AUTHORITY OF SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY
Introduction
Walter Feinberg is widely known in the area of educational
philosophy through his numerous publications and his active partici-
pation in national professional associations. Since receiving his
degree in philosophy at Boston University in 1966, except for a year
at Oakland University in California, he has been on the education
faculty at the University of Illinois at Champagne-Urbana
,
Illinois.^
In addition to his articles in defense of the humanities and on
educational theory, he has written a book. Reason and Rhetoric
,
which
is a critique of liberalism and John Dewey's work, and edited two
books. Work, Technology, and Education and Equality and Social Policy .
The method described in the first chapter of Reason and Rhetoric
is illustrative of Feinberg 's work in general. He sees education
as a subdivision of political philosophy in which expression of ideas
is controlled by ideological aims. His objective is to identify the
"tensions" or conflicts underlying assumptions in the ideology of
liberalism, especially in relation to Progressive educational reform
in America. He believes that although liberals thought that their




itself an ideology, and its reform proposals were motivated by
principles which were uncritical of their own service to middle-class
interests. Feinberg thinks that the liberal principles reflect
committment to beliefs about social conditions that may formerly have
seemed unalterable. But in fact the committments were then and are
now matters of choice. The choices, Feinberg maintains, are
ultimately moral ones, and his analysis seeks to expose the "tension"
in liberalism that violates fundamental moral values. For example,
he sees a tension between liberal respect for individual rights and
approval of technological development. But the tension was resolved
by giving priority to technological requirements. The basic value
which liberalism compromised was individual freedom and equality. His
book and most of his articles are devoted to showing how Dewey and
other individuals who used the rhetoric of freedom, devised a rationale
to undermine individual freedom through public education.
Feinberg *s Critique of Dewey
Technology and morality . A major theme of Feinberg *s is the threat
which the development of technology has come to present to human
freedom. Technology represents that which is non-human or artificial,
as opposed to that which is genuinely human. While he acknowledges
that liberals like Dewey refuse to make such a distinction,
he believes
that there is a dynamic in technology that does not appear
to be
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controlled by human will, and which is capable of enslaving the
human will to its requirements. He cites the development of military
technology as an example of technology potentially destroying its
creator. Liberalism was the ideology that historically arose with
the development of technology, and served to adapt American attitudes
and values to its needs. In order to support this view, Feinberg
interprets Dewey's work "Evolution and Ethics" as an attempt to
formulate a Darwinian view of moral values which would weaken the
power of traditionally established values to control the activity of
science and technology. The eighteenth century required science
and technology to submit to fixed ideas of htiman nature and society,
3
and to "a set standard" of moral values. In the name of scientific
objectivity, however, Dewey proposed a biological model of human
nature rather than an ethical model, and tried to show the way in
which moral values played an instrumental part in the struggle for
survival. According to Feinberg, Dewey argued that "ethical
behavior was consistent with evolutionary activity because in the
long run the survival of the fittest meant the survival of the
ethically best."^ Therefore, Dewey was substituting an evolutionary
and functionalist criterion for a theological one. The consequence
of this change, in Feinberg' s view, was an ethical relativism which
not only subverted the authority of traditional values, but paved
the way for a system of education that was free to manipulate
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children's attitudes in the interest of conformity without the
control of traditional ethical sanctions. That which was distinctive-
ly human, "the will", was objectified and reduced to an object of
manipulation and control.
The testing movement. In connection with the testing and vocational
education movements, Feinberg regards Dewey's influence as favorable.
He credits Dewey with a more far-sighted vision of the moral purposes
of education than the leaders of technology who sponsored the
testing movement, and he commends Dewey's concern to keep the goals
of community and individuality prominent, as opposed to those who
considered public education as an instrument of industrial training.
Nevertheless, Feinberg argues, Dewey failed to see that there was no
necessary connection between an individual's interest and the
possibility of satisfying that interest in the existing labor market.
He criticizes Dewey for not opposing the concept and practice of the
division of labor, and for not recognizing the way in which Dewey's
own educational goals and methods were applied differently in schools
of the middle class as opposed to those of the lower class.
Equal opportunity. If one of the problems of liberalism is the tension
between traditional morality and the requirements of technological
development, Dewey can be seen as taking the side of technology,
not
evolutionist ethics, but in the emphasis he putonly in his work on
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on schooling as an instrument of equal opportunity. The concept of
equal opportunity may be seen as a way of reconciling the require-
ments of a technologically based industry and the demands of workers
for justice in the distribution of economic rewards. Equal
opportunity as a principle of educational policy claims that if
,
in
the commercial and industrial sector, the rewards an individual
receives do not seem commensurate with what he fairly deserves, at
least in schooling there will be justice. The rewards in terms of
academic achievement will be a reflection of talent or ability, and
not of contingent qualities such as race, religion, family back-
ground, or wealth. If it is assumed that scholastic achievement
correlates with achievement in commerce and industry, then schooling
can offer something to both business and labor. To the employee it
can promise a just compensation for his efforts and talent, at first
in school, and later in employment; and to business it can offer
a pool of skilled labor. Feinberg believes that this view was
central to educational liberalism. He understands Dewey’s emphasis
on schooling, as opposed to the educative function of other social
institutions, to be due to his concern to have schooling support
technological development. That is, Dewey's willingness to narrow
education to include no more than schooling suggests that his
broad
aims for personal growth were less important than his
more limited
aims for skill development compatible with the needs
of one's service
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to existing technology. The question raised by Feinberg is, given
the requirements of industrial or technological developnnent
,
and
those of a just reward for Individual effort, when the two come into
conflict, on which side does Dewey come down?^
Feinberg cites two examples to support his belief that Dewey’s
choice is to support industrial technology against distributive
justice. The first is a summary of the Polish study which describes
Dewey as opposing the rights of Polish immigrants for self determin-
ation, and as subjecting them to arbitrary tests of their loyalty to
the United States because they resisted Americanization and submission
to the military and industrial interests of this country. A second
example is Dewey's comment on P.S 26, a black school in Indianapolis
in Schools of Tomorrow .
Dewey gives a very favorable account of the unusual vocational
education program and the community relations activities under the
title of "The School as Settlement." Feinberg, however, comments
that Dewey failed to use this occasion as an opportunity to comment
either on racial segregation or on the way equal opportunity is
readily compromised for members of the lower class. Dewey has praise
for the school’s contribution of trained labor but not a word for the
requirements of justice in this situation.
Concept of history. Another aspect of the tension between techno-




maintains that although not much of a case could be made for
progress in moral terms since man’s earliest civilization, techno-
logy required some concept of progress to give moral support to its
expansion. Liberalism provided the support with the "new history"
of Robinson, Beard, and Dewey. I'Jhile Dewey is not accused of the
excessive praise of progress, he is said to have established the
theoretical foundation for it in his denial of the universality of
knowledge in Logic; The Theory of Inquiry. According to Feinberg,
Dewey argues that science and technology "were so new and so
significant to man’s experience that they required a reinterpretation
of human values and their institutional expressions." The view of
this position provided by most interpreters of Dewey was that
Dewey recognized the social havoc technology was causing and he
wished to support efforts to adjust institutions to new conditions.
Feinberg, however, reasons that the role of scholarship ought "to be
to try first to be clear about the nature of human values, and then
to try to limit technology according to the requirements of certain
ethical norms.
As Feinberg summarized Dewey’s view of history, he emphasized
Dewey's stress on the constructive social function of historiography.
Dewey argued that the historian must accept responsibility for his
choice of issues to research in terms of contemporary social needs.




opinion of how that responsibility should be discharged.^ Feinberg
believes that Dewey thought that there was really only one set of
social issues to which historiography should be oriented, and that
was industrialization, the development of technology, democratic
institutions, and scientific procedures. While Dewey himself, Fein-
berg says, did not go so far as to say that America was the realiz-
ation of the democratic dream, Dewey's view of history lent itself
to the work of other liberals who did take this position. Dewey's
fault, then, in terms of his view of history, was to have failed to
anticipate the value of the traditional view of the objectivity of
the past in the light of the pressures of powerful institutions
and movements to write history in their own interest.
Social theory. In addition to a view of the past that served
technological development, Feinberg describes a view of society that
formed the liberal contribution to the same purpose. Although
liberals in the late 1920s and early 1930s acquired a reputation for
radicalism, Feinberg says that their actual conservatism was not
obvious until the time of the depression, when, in contrast to
Marxist theories of social class conflict, liberals were forced to
develop a pressure group theory of society. Although the Soci^
Frontier did publish a series of articles in which a number of
liberal educators debated Marxist theory of class analysis and
its
implications for schooling, Dewey along with the others came to
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reject that position in favor of the pressure group theory, first
proposed by Arthur Bentley in 1908.® According to Feinberg, class
analysis differed from pressure group theory in giving priority to
normative questions of just distribution of wealth, while the latter
pretended to give a descriptive analysis of existing political
process. The assumption of pressure group theory was that questions
of distributive justice were not significant since the balancing of
countervailing interest groups by government produced the best
resolution of conflict that was possible. In Feinberg 's view, this
amounted to substituting social order for social justice, and this
substitution he recognizes as an identifying characteristic of
liberal social theory.
He acknowledges that Dewey and Manheim recognized a concept
of "functional rationality" by which western society was progress-
ively incorporating both men and machines into a system of production
and distribution which placed increasingly large intellectual demands
on those at the top of the social hierarchy, and increasingly less
on those at the bottom. And Feinberg admits that there is ground
for their fear that this "drive toward functional rationality" would
endanger humanitarian social goals, but he also says that their
remedies were, at best, pedestrian. The explanation Feinberg gives
for their ineffectiveness is that liberals, including Dewey, saw
the role of the intellectual, not as a critic of the social system*
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but as loyal advisor.
In response to the revisionist historians’ charge that liberals
have manipulated those whom their rhetoric claims to have freed,
Feinberg says that the charge must be made more specific. The
clarification he suggests is that liberals have made the advancement
of technology their goal and the principle of implementing it
functional integration. Schools were to aim at modifying behavior
as well as values, to make children fit the needs of technology, but
no means was provided by which the moral value of technology or
functional integration could be evaluated by the students. "With
social science as the vehicle and functional integration as the
goal, the moral aspects of manipulation were seen as the remnant of
9
a distant and inadequate metaphysics." The revisionists were
mistaken in making an issue merely out of the schools as an instrument
of social control. The real issue was not that the schools taught
children what the rules were for playing the economic game, but that
they did not teach them to test the rules. "In the long run the
function of education should be not only to teach the rules, but to
..10
teach students to evaluate their effectiveness.
Principle of equality . The question of fairness raises a final
challenge Feinberg makes to liberalism: a revision of the
doctrine
of equality of educational opportunity. Liberalism, he
says, made
education with the concept of equalityits historic contribution to
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of opportunity. It was a value as an advance over the earlier
principle of allocating educational resources on the basis of
inherited status. However, equality of opportunity is a dated
principle because as a guide to allocating educational resources
today, it arbitrarily limits those qualities it considers contingent.
That is, while it denies that race, religion, sex, or ethnic back-
ground are relevant to the amount or quality of schooling received,
the principle does not exclude intelligence, talent, or genetic
endowment. Feinberg argues that if the principle of educational
opportunity worked perfectly, it would continually grant greater
advantage to the fewer and fewer people of greater ability, until
the distinction between the culturally rich and poor became so
extreme, all possibility of "equality" would be lost. Progressively,
those with less cultural advantage would lose the skills to argue for
and compel the resources that they would need to survive.
He proposes then to substitute a "principle of equality for
the liberals’ "principle of equality of opportunity." The
principle of equality would provide that access to educational re-
sources, along with civil rights, would be alio ted equally to all,
independent of individual ability. When a socially important skill
is needed, excess resources could be allocated for its
development.
In order to select the person to receive the excess
resources, the
rule would be, "that a person is entitled to a
disproportionate share
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of the educational expenditure when there is reasonable evidence to
indicate that he is able to reach a specifiable (but not elaborated)
level of professional competence, and when he demonstrates that he
is willing to apply a disproportionate share of his energy towards
directly and consciously improving the general well-being and
specifically the well-being of the least advantaged member of society'.'
This principle of equality, Feinberg suggests, will fulfill the
requirement of justice and morality which liberalism abandonned
in its devotion to technological development.
SuTTimary. Feinberg’ s critique of Dewey may be summarized under the
following points:
1) Dewey' s ultimate ideological committment was to technological
development in the United States. His experimentalist view of
ethics and morality was a device to persuade individuals to see
their own interests as served by supporting the growth of
industrial technology.
2) Dewey was correct in resisting the exploitative character
of
the Testing Movement in education, but the fact that he did not
object to the division of labor indicates that his real motive
was to make public schooling a place to train more highly
skilled labor.
3) Dewey's affirmation of equal opportunity
as educational policy
was in practice a way of getting young people
to accept unequal
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distribution of economic rewards on the basis of personal
traits which were not in fact within their control. Equal
educational opportunity, therefore, worked to bring about
economic inequality.
4) Dewey's instrumentalist view of history contributed to the
liberal myth of America as the realization of moral and social
progress, which concealed growing social conflict.
5) Dewey’s support for the pressure group theory instead of a
class conflict theory substituted concern for social stabil-
ity for a desire for social justice.
6) A new "principle of equality" could help schooling lead to
genuine economic equality.
Assessment
Technology. The problem of technology in Dewey has been discussed
before,^^ and Feinberg adds little to what has already been said
except his ideological interpretation. Dewey was aware of both the
benefits and penalties of technology, and he was not one-sided in his
praise of technology. But, granted the destructive effects of
technology, what was to be done about it? Dewey observed that
its
benefits were more apparent in its products than in its
processes,
and he acknowledged that the processes had become
dehumanizing to




rehumanized. He argued that the destructiveness of technology was
a historical and not a logical fact, and that the most urgent social
task that confronted industrial nations was the development of
methods of production which support the full human development of
their workers.^^
But Feinberg argues further: "One of the fixed conditions
that the liberal accepted was the continued growth of technology as
the factor around which all other aspects of men’s social and
intellectual activity was to be adjusted including his will."^^
While it is true that Dewey did consider the growth of technology
as a cultural given, and one that promised great benefits if managed
intelligently, it is untrue to say that Dewey wished to adjust the
human will to the requirements of technology. His concern to
humanize industrial relations stressed just the opposite, the
adjustment of technology to human social needs. He stated.
This then is the task indicated. It is, if we employ large terms,
to humanize science. The task in the concrete cannot be
accomplished save as the fruit of science, which is named
technology, is also humanized.
At the beginning of Reason and Rhetoric Feinberg maintains that
he himself is ambivalent about technology, but that he intends to go
on "to examine the thought and activity of those people who believed
that technology was not an essential threat to man." His conclusion
by the end of the book, however, seems to be that technology is in
fact a threat to human freedom. We may conclude, then, that he is
no
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longer ambivalent, and that he now agrees with those who say that
technology somehow logically precludes the possibility of human
control. If this is so, Feinberg's position is significantly
different from Dewey's. He is arguing that there is something about
technology (or about human nature) that prevents its management in
the interest of humane social relationships. If so, it would be
important to hear more specifically his grounds for this position,
and how a decision could be made to extricate technology from the
culture we now have. Feinberg does not discuss any alternative to
technology, or what the implications of his criticism of Dewey on
this subject might be.
In Dewey's writing, however, it is just this view of tech-
nology, as if it were somehow independent of human choice and decision
that he wished to change. In a chapter entitled "Labor and Leisure
in Democracy and Education the separation of intelligence and moral
conviction from labor is characterized as "the Aristotelian view' of
labor, and as reflecting a long-established distinction in status
between social groups who work with their hands and those who work
with their heads. It is a major aim of Dewey in his social theory
to overcome that distinction by making labor as well as all
industrial
activity become an expression of the intelligent application
of the
highest values of humanity. In this sense, (i.e. technology
as the
combination of intelligent morality and physical activity)
Feinberg
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was correct in saying, "Technology, as Dewey expressed it, was the
1^8®® j the principle around which all other relations were now
to be ordered." The statement by Feinberg is not true, however,
if it is understood to mean that industrial activity for private
profit is the new logos. ... On the contrary, Dewey maintained
that "Any scheme for vocational education which takes its point of
departure from the industrial regime that now exists, is likely to
18
assume and perpetuate its divisions and weaknesses. . . "
The testing movement. Dewey did not object to the division of labor
because he understood the practice as a symptom rather than a cause
of social inequality. He was more concerned to restore democratic
practices such as worker participation in decision-making processes.
Division of labor could be a cooperative practice and a mutually
beneficial one rather than an exploitative one under more democratic
circumstances
.
Feinberg refers to Dewey's Schools of Tomorrow to show that
where white middle class children were concerned, Dewey was eager to
have Progressive education train them for the more sophisticated
skills being required for management level jobs. At the same time,
says Feinberg, he was content to have blacks trained in skills that
kept them at the level of menial workers. Feinberg draws this
conclusion not from anything Dewey says in Schools of Tomorrow^ but
Dewey is attacked for not taking thefrom what he does not say.
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occasion of his description of a black school as an opportunity to
comment on the race problem in education. It is true that there is
no discussion in Dewey's writings about racial discrimination in
education, but his position on the issue was clear. In his article
Racial Prejudice and Friction it is clear that he regards racial
prejudice as "a deep-seated and widespread social disease.
Nevertheless, he says that frequently racial prejudice is discussed
in an atmosphere of moral indignation without a corresponding desire
to deal intelligently or to take assertive action on the issue. In
this article he examines institutional relationships which are
responsible for racial discrimination, and proposes support for
immigration control until countries can deal with the internal poli-
tical and economic arrangements which would be necessary to reduce
tension between races. It is not true, as Feinberg suggests, that
Dewey supported discriminatory practices or favored the continued
subjugation of minority groups to the economic interests of the
white middle class.
Equal opportunity. Feinberg argued that the liberal ideal of
equality of opportunity arose out of two sources: a concern for
justice and a concern to provide trained labor for industrial
technology. The concern for justice was that individuals should be
allowed to enjoy economic achievement without hinderance from race,
religion, or social class. The second concern was that the source
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of that economic achievement, employment in the economic sector, be
protected and encouraged. According to Feinberg, liberals saw no
contradiction between the schools' role as serving individuals'
desire for personal growth and economic advancement, and their service
to technology. In fact, he says, there was a contradiction, and it
became evident in the way justice was sacrificed in the treatment
of individuals who belonged to minority groups. As evidence he cites
the treatment of blacks in Dewey's book. Schools of Tomorrow
,
Dewey's
study of the Polish community in Philadelphia, and an account of the
Bureau of Intercultural Education in Detroit.
The major point Feinberg makes in this connection is that
there is an inconsistency between Dewey's concepts of community and
technology. While technology has efficient production of goods as its
end, the ideal of a democratic community has justice as its end. The
two inevitably come into conflict, and then, Feinberg says, Dewey
understands technology as the given to which justice must yield.
This dialectical posing of the problem is not an accurate
representation of Dewey's view. Neither of the two principal terms
holds the absolute and mutually exclusive character for Dewey that
Feinberg gives to them. Dewey is clear that human community is the
end, and that technology, in the sense of the application of both the
method and product of science to human interaction, is the means.
Industrial technology is not an end for Dewey. He states in numerous
66
places that the domination of technology over social institutions
is an historical consequence of human failure to accept responsibil-
20ity for shaping social institutions, not a logical consequence.
The evidence from Dewey's work does not confirm Feinberg's
interpretation. First, the mere absence of a protest against racial
discrimination in connection with the black school in Indianapolis,
cannot be counted as evidence that Dewey was willing to compromise
justice in schooling for the sake of supplying industrial labor.
Dewey says in this connection.
Mr. Valentine’s school is located in the poor, crowded, colored
district of the city and has only colored pupils. It is not
an attempt to solve "the race question", nor yet an experiment
suited only to colored people. . . Yet the success of the
experiment would mean a real step forward in solving "the race
quest^^n" and peculiar problems of any immigrant district as
well
.
Dewey recognized the economic roots of racial prejudice and saw the
effectiveness of the school in its ability to improve economic





Feinberg's reading of the Polish study is that Dewey proposed
a loyalty test for the Polish American citizens which would have
violated their civil rights. Since Dewey's real concern,
according
to Feinberg, was to maintain Polish labor for technology,
the
report shows that Dewey was willing to sacrifice the
demands of
justice for the interest of technology. Such a reading of the
Polish
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study is contrived, however. In fact, the study is an example of
Dewey's concern for supporting the interests of democratic government
among the Polish people both in America and in Europe. A conserva-
tive, anti-democratic group related to former monarchists had
managed to secure the support of the British, French, and United
States governments, and to set up a committee in Paris as a govern-
ment in exile. Its agent in America was the Polish musician,
Paderewski, living in Philadelphia. The Polish American community
at the time Dewey made his Polish study was in the midst of a power
struggle between the Paris committee and the representatives of a
socialist democratic group, the K.O.N.. Dewey believed that both
Polish Americans and Europeans would benefit from the success of the
K.O.N. and worked to get the United States government to favor the
more democratic group. What Feinberg called the loyalty test, which
supposedly would have violated the civil rights of the Poles, was
a proposal for an American commission to supervise funds and
publications in the Polish community in the light of widely
acknowledged abuse. Feinberg uses the material in the Polish
study to imply that Dewey was more concerned about the service of
Polish labor to American industry than for the civil rights of
Polish Americans. In fact, Dewey's defense of those who fought
for more democratic control of Polish affairs led him to oppose both




Feinberg argues that Dewey formulated a view of history
that rationalized the growth of technology by affirming a notion of
social progress and by describing contemporary American culture as
achieving "the Great Community." By opposing a traditional view of
history, which stressed the objectivity of historical events,
Dewey legitimized a subjectivistic historiography that concealed the
failure of liberalism to deal with social ills, and created an ideal-
ized view of the past, which Americans took for fact.
It is true that Dewey himself wrote little about the study
of history although he included much historical material in his
expository writing. The secondary work on his views about histori-
24
ography is also limited. Nevertheless, we can say what his views
on the subject were, even if we cannot say what secret ideological
purpose lay behind them.
Dewey's view of history was formulated in connection with
developments in German historical research. While Dewey objected
to what seemed exaggerated claims to scientific objectivity, he
nevertheless admired the new research techniques, and believed that
they foreshadowed the methodological breakthrough in social science
that had already been achieved in the natural sciences. While he
continued to stress the role of historical studies in the development
of social policy, and to emphasize the degree to which present
social problems shape the perception of the past, he saw that histo-
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rical research could serve social policy only if it had a method
which could be trusted to reveal connections between events that
were empirically valid. Insofar as sound methods of historical
research yielded patterns of continuity that could be independently
confirmed by separate researchers and could claim objective
validity, Dewey favored the use of the method. His point, however,
was that the meaning of historical events was not isolated from the
significance of those events for social policy, and the historian
25had a role to play in policy formation.
Feinberg maintains that "the inspirational component of
liberal thought was expressed by a belief in progress that became
the sustaining force behind many proposals for educational change
and social reform. However, this same belief shielded technology
and the principle of greatest efficiency that guided its growth,
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from careful consideration." On the contrary, however, Dewey
writes in his article entitled "Progress" that it is precisely the
notion of progress protecting technology that has been exposed and
discredited by the First World War.
We know now that science has not only rendered the enginery of
war more deadly, but has also increased the powers of resistant
endurance when the war comes. If all this does not demonstrate
that the forces which have brought about complicated and
extensive changes in the fabric of society do not of themselves^y
generate progress, I do not know what a demonstration would be.
There does not appear to be anything in Dewey's work that
legitimizes any social policy that subjects individuals to impersonal
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technological ends. That is what his view of history was intended
to prevent. He did not equate America with the realization of a
social utopia, although he had hopes for great social achievements
which were common in his day. His views of history appeared to
offer an instrument to criticize those features of liberalism
Feinberg himself objects to rather than to legitimize them.
Social theory. Feinberg was incorrect in saying that Dewey espoused
a pressure group theory over the Marxist class conflict theory
in order to justify social control by an elitist group. On the one
hand, there is nowhere in Dewey’s writings where he states such a
motive, and on the other, his work persistently stresses opposition
to elitist control and the urgency of individual participation in
intelligent control over and responsibility for one’s own destiny.
No government by experts in which the masses do not have the
chance to inform the experts as to their needs can be anything
but an oligarchy managed in the interest of a few. And the
enlightenment must proceed in ways that force the administrative
specialists to take account of the needs. The world has ,
suffered more from leaders and authorities than from the masses.
If one asks how could Feinberg have gotten such an impression
of Dewey if there were so little grounds for it, Joe Burnett, in a
recent article entitled, ’’John Dewey and the Ploys of Revisionism",
suggests three features of Dewey’s work that could lead to such a
misinterpretation. First, when Dewey discusses "democracy" he
seems to use the word without the political characteristics normally
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associated with the term, such as majority rule and representative
government. He believes that groups like the family with parents
dominant, or a professional group with skilled craftsmen dominant,
can be called democratic. Second, in Dewey’s emphasis on science,
intelligence, and the method of inquiry, it is possible on a few
occasions to interpret him as referring to the body of scientists
as an elite corps whose services are indispensible to social reform.
Third, on some occasions Dewey appears to see education as a
substitute for the kind of authority which would be wielded coercively
in the absence of education. For example, he says.
The devotion of democracy to education is a familiar fact. The
superficial explanation is that a government resting upon popular
suffrage cannot be successful unless those who elect and those
who obey their governors are educated. Since a democratic
society repudiates the principle of external authority, it must
find a substitute in voluntary disposition and interest; these
can be created only by education.
Burnett points out that in each of these cases it is only a
superficial reading of Dewey that would yield the interpretation that
he was not committed to political democracy or that he favored man-
agement of society by a scientific elite, or that he opposed parti-
cipatory democracy. A careful reading of the contexts of questionable
passages indicates that Dewey regarded majority rule, for example,
as the form of democracy, but the ethical concept of community as its
substance. That is, the specific forms of democratic political life
do not themselves protect from the tyrrany of the majority or the loss
of community. Political democracy is instrumental to democracy as
an ethical concept, and that is why Dewey gives the unorthodox
definition of democracy stated in Democracy and Education.
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While Feinberg attacks Dewey for his failure to emphasize the
political character of this society and its educational system,
Burnett notes that such a criticism overlooks the most basic claim
in Dewey's social theory. As Sorajee concluded in his study The Poli-
tical Theory of John Dewey
,
"The political analyst must go beyond
the formal structures of political institutions, and must take into
account the broad social structure within which they function, and
30
from which they derive their peculiarities." The same point is
made by Burnett:
One can see why Dewey might be a bane of political philosophers.
They are apt to criticize him for having no developed theory of
power or domination, and hence, no political philosophy. The
point, however, is that Dewey has a theory of social democracy
to which, given its nature, political philosophy is secondary,
and in a very real sense, from which it is derivitive. One
suspects that they criticize him for not having something as basic
which the very nature of the case he wants to argue is not
basic.
The priority Dewey gives to the social or ethical concept of
democracy as the ideal community also illuminates Feinberg 's comment
on "functional integration." Feinberg argues that Progressive
reformers were deliberately unreflective about the principles on which
their efforts were based, and so allowed themselves to be
used by
the elite of corporate technology. "Thus instead of a
prolonged
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evaluation of the principles of social organization itself, the
Progressives insisted on evaluating institutions merely on the basis
of their functional integration.” The fact that Dewey understood
political institutions as secondary to the social concept of idealized
community shows that such a claim is patently untrue of Dewey, as
Burnett notes. "All of this is sheer error: Dewey flatly refused
33to make the functional arguments to supplant his principles.”
Principle of equality. Feinberg advances his proposal for a principle
of equality as opposed to Dewey's principle of equal opportunity on
the grounds that equal opportunity has failed to achieve economic
equality. Indeed, in revisionist fashion, he infers that reformers
like Dewey never intended to achieve real equality.
Although Feinberg seems to have a quantitative view of what
equality requires, Dewey's view argues that equality is a principle
for resolving social conflict rather than a description of a specific
quantitative distribution of resources at some future time. In an
article from the New Republic entitled "Individuality, Equality,
and Superiority,” he noted that the current use of testing in
education aimed at fitting individuals into established economic
classifications. Ironically this practice was pursued in the name
of individualism by those "aristocrats” who believed that democracy
has foresaken its traditional concern for individuals. But
Dewey





It (democracy) denotes faith in individuality, in uniquely distinct
qualities in each normal human being; faith in corresponding
unique modes of activity that create new ends, with willing
acceptance of the modifications of the established order entailed
by the release of individualized capacities.
Dewey notes that early advocates of democracy, like John Adams
and Thomas Jefferson, never denied distinctions in natural abilities.
but sought to insure that political procedures actually served the
moral principle of the equality of all. "Both agreed," said Dewey,
"that equality is moral, a matter of justice socially secured, not of
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physical or psychological endowment." Since the economic system
tended to grant excessive political power to those with socially
undesirable native abilities, and allowed their success to be
counted as "superiority", it was especially urgent that the distinctly
moral sense of equality be emphasized.
Moral equality cannot be conceived on the basis of legal, political,
and economic arrangements. For all these are bound to be
classificatory ; to be concerned with uniformities and statistical
averages. Moral equality means incommensurability, t||
inapplicability of common and qualitative standards.
The task of education in a democracy is to cultivate those aptitudes
that reflect the diversity, the uniqueness, and the individuality of
its citizens. Dewey concludes, "The democrat, with his faith in
moral
equality, is the representative of aristocracy made universal.
His
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equality is that of distinction made universal.
In view of this understanding of equality, there appears
to be
no ground for Feinberg to argue that Dewey's equality
of opportunity
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as a subtrafuge for social control of workers. Indeed, Feinberg’s
own proposal appears to be an example of just such a reduction of
the concept of equality to a device of economic classification, and,
as Dewey suggested, to play into the tendency of administrators to
translate worthwhile goals into programs evaluated by quantitative
criteria which defeat the purpose of the original goals. If
Feinberg's argument is that there must be some point at which
ethical goals materially influence the economic condition of
citizens for the better, Dewey would hardly disagree. But to
divide education into financially measurable shares to be distributed
in such a way that some require a social obligation of service and
others do not, makes both education and social service into
commodities, and gives education an unnecessarily private signifi-
cance, and social service the appearance of a penalty.
In general, Feinberg's critique of Dewey suffers from a
failure to distinguish Dewey's own position from that of other
liberals of his time. It does not acknowledge Dewey's protest
against the pressures of industrialization, and his innovative
efforts to build a conceptual framework from which to make many of
the same criticisms that Feinberg would like to make. The theme
of Dewey's Reconstruction in Philosophy , for example, calling for
the inclusion of a moral perspective in scientific and philosophical
themes of Feinberg's work.thinking, is not far at all from the major
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While it may be true that Dewey did not envision the concentrations
of wealth and power of the nineteen seventies and the problems that
would be raised for the kind of democratic life he had hoped for,
his work did not pretend to anticipate or to minimize the difficulty
of moral decisions that would have to be made later. The construc-
tive value of Feinberg’s work lies less in his critique of Dewey
than in his underscoring of the urgency of Dewey’s vision of
industrial democracy in an era when individual participation in




SCHOOLING AS THE REPRODUCTION OF THE SOCIAL RELATIONS OF CAPITALISM
Introduction
In 1973 Bowles and Gintis presented a paper at the Institute
for open education on the topic of John Dewey and liberal educational
reform. Much of the same material was published in their article
"The Contradictions of Liberal Educational Reform" in Work, Technology
and Education in 1975, and in chapter two of Schooling in Capitalist
1
America in 1976. Although they have modified many of their views
in response to criticism provoked by their works, nothing has
appeared in print to indicate that their understanding of Dewey and
his relation to liberal educational reform has changed.
No distinction is made in their work between education and
schooling. The two are understood interchangeably as what occurs
in public schools which are under the hierarchical control of
bureaucratic officials, who are themselves controlled by members of
an economic elite. The school system operates in the interest of
creating, at the lower levels, a pool of minimally skilled labor
which serves to keep wages low by creating surplus labor. At
higher educational levels, the school system serves to sort out
in




skills, but still is subservient to the needs of the capitalist
elite for employees who take a minimal share of the profits.
Their major claim is that education is a process reproducing
the social relations of capitalism. That is, while educators in the
twentieth century had tended to understand schooling as training
in cognitive skills
,
and have rationalized unequal economic achieve-
ment by saying that it reflected an inequality in the natural or
genetic endowment of the students, in fact, schooling performed
its major function through the "hidden curriculum" by training
children in the social attitudes and values of subservient labor.
The split between the influence of schooling on the cognitive
and affective development of children is related in the view of
Bowles and Gintis to the breakdown of the liberal theory of
schooling. In Bowles and Gintis' view the movement for compulsory
public schooling corresponded with the growth of factories in the
twentieth century. Compulsory schooling was instituted on the
basis of the promise from educators that the skills students would
acquire would provide assurance of upward economic mobility. A further
major expansion of schooling came in the latter part of the
nineteenth a rd early twentieth century when the development
of
corporate capitalism required more sophisticated labor
and the
secondary school movement flourished. Education is at
present being
transformed by a third change in the economic structure
of capitalism,
which Bowles and Gintis identify as the
"proletarianization of the
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professional class, reflected in vocational education in college
level programs
.
Liberal approaches to education are characterized by the
tendency to adapt educational beliefs and practices to the needs
of the capitalist economic system. The technique of regarding
schooling in terms of cognitive skills which are measurable through
I.Q. tests was an attempt to legitimize economic inequalities
realized by students after schooling by categorizing children
according to cognitive skills and by claiming that those with
greater skills deserve more rewards than those with less. At the
same time, the inculcation of submission to authority was the
major economic function of schooling, although that was not
acknowledged by liberal educators, except as a regrettable flaw
in the existing system.
The subject of attack . While Bowles and Gintis do not summarize
Dewey's argument in their article, it seems useful to do so despite
its familiarity. Dewey begins with a series of definitions which
are conspicuous for their generality, and which attempt to avoid
controversial questions. For example, by "society" he means all
people regarded collectively, living in a community of related
interdependent individuals, or any such subgroup, without regard to
whether it is capitalist or socialist, democratic or totalitarian,
etc. . By "culture" he means all ideas, attitudes,
values, skills,
80
and dispositions, as well as the artifacts of these, which enable
people to survive in a physical environment
,
without regard to
whether the arrangement is hierarchical or egalitarian, alienated
or not, etc.. He further defines "natural environment" as the
physical world in the most general sense, assuming that it is at
least minimally receptive to human influence and direction, but
without foreclosing the question of whether it is either ultimately
subject to supernatural or trans-historical forces or chaotic. He
believes that order in social affairs is a product of the inter-
action of intelligent human activity and the non-human physical
world. "Growth," he understands as the continuous reconstruction
of experience as well as physical maturation, without regard to
whether it is internal or external, intrinsic or extrinsic. Indeed,
he would regard both sets of terms as misleading when applied to
the concept of growth. Personal growth cannot be distinguished from
social growth in any significant way.
His general argument runs as follows: society relies on the
communication of culture to each succeeding generation for its
survival in its physical environment. "Education stands for the
transmission of culture from the dying to the rising generation.
"Schooling" is the form of education that occurs when a culture
becomes literate and requires a social structure consciously
devoted to education in a systematic manner. Therefore, there is
no society without education and no literate society without
81
schooling.
In the case of some societies there is evidence of a
continuous development of the ability to survive more effectively
by adapting to increasingly complex features of the environment.
Societies which employ authoritarian methods of education and maintain
rigidly stratified social divisions do not show such development.
When the development does occur, it is attributable to a type of
social arrangement he calls "democratic": i.e. a form of social
organization which reflects a continuous expansion of interests held
in common between individucil members and increasing interaction and
cooperative intercourse between social groups.
It follows then that if social development is the aim of a
society, its education must be democratic. It is important to note
that the democratic character of education is contingent, not
necessary, from a logical point of view. Education is entitled to
be called democratic when its focus is on continuous reconstruction
of experience to increase the recognized meaning or social content,
and to increase the capacity of individuals to act as the directive
guardians of this reorganization. Reflective thinking as the method
of reconstructing experience is the aim of education, and growth
defined in this way is its only aim. Schooling is a necessary
social institution if the aim of society is development, in order to
achieve the deliberate, systematic, and continued cultivation of
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this capacity in the members of society.
Dewey was committed to the implementation of his theory of
education. He argued that present limitations exist to the
realization of such a type of education. The major limitation is
that society is divided into rival groups competing for political
control over eachother. Resistance to his proposed unification of
social effort "springs from the notion that experience consists of
a variety of segregated domains or interests, each having its own
independent value, material, and method, each checking every other,




kind of 'balance of powers' in education." These domains, however,
he believes are imaginary, and are caused by the division of society
into more or less rigidly marked off classes or groups in obstruction
of full and flexible interaction and intercourse. Dewey believed
that such social divisions could and would be modified progressively
by a program of democratic education in schools. The unspoken con-
dition, however, was the continued committment to democratic social
ends
.
Bowles' and Gintis' criticism. Such a theory could be attacked
empirically or conceptually. When Bowles and Gintis presented the
same paper mentioned above at the Institute for Open Education in
August of 1973, the title of their lecture was "If John Dewey Calls,
Tell Him Things Didn't Work Out." This title, at least, implies
the
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empirical criticism by suggesting that the theory may have been
correct, but that it was not verified by its consequences. A
consciously conceptual criticism, however, might argue either that
the principal terms of the argument were not working definitions
because they were arbitrary or differed in meaning from the same
terms describing the consequences predicted, or that the premises of
the argviment were contradictory. Bowles and Gintis claim to make
the latter argument while in fact, I suggest, they are making the
former.
Their criticism runs as follows. Dewey's argument is vulner-
able conceptually because the functions of schooling are contra-
dictory, and empirically because schools do not have the power to
perform the functions assigned to them.
According to Dewey, they argue, schools have three functions:
1) to produce the kind of individuals capable and willing to staff
the various occupational, political, and other adult roles required
by an expanding economy and stable polity, 2) to equalize social
opportunity, and 3) to promote the psychic and moral development of
the individual. Although Dewey sees these functions as logically
interdependent, they argue, in fact they are not, for the following
reasons. In view of the fact that American society has managed
to survive and grow, at least economically, there can be no denial
that function 1) has been fulfilled. On the other hand, they argue
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that there has been abundant empirical evidence that conditions two
and three have not been fulfilled. They offer various sorts of
evidence to suggest that education has not equalized the distribution
of economic resources among the population, but has served to
concentrate them in fewer hands according to established class
privilege. Further, they cite reports which serve to indicate that
education has become more authoritarian and repressive, and hence
less concerned with promoting the psychic and personal growth of
students. The conclusion to be drawn from these observations is that
at the very least the three fxinctions of schooling given by Dewey are
not reciprocally necessary, and have no necessary logical connection.
The stronger claim is what Bowles and Gintis would really like to
show: mainly, that the functions are actually contradictory.
We will go much further and assert that the way in which the
school system performs its expanded reproduction function
through its production of a labor force for the capitalist
enterprise is inconsistent with its performance of either
the self-development or the equality of opportunity function.
Under corporate capitalism, the correspondence between the
social relations of production and the social relations of
reproduction the essential mechanism of the expanded
reproduction function of schooling precludes an egalitarian,
humane education under corporate capitalism.
The failures of the school system to serve the individual
needs for personal self-development and its poor showing as
a promoter of equal opportunity are thus not the results of
errors in practice but rather flow directly from a fundamental
theoretical error, namely, the contradictory nature of the
objectives of liberal educational reform.
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In order to demonstrate the stronger of the two possible
conclusions suggested above, they argue that capitalist economics
relies on a systematic social organization designed to produce an
adequate labor force and ultimately to reproduce itself. To do so
it requires an educational system which will instill those attitudes,
values, beliefs, personality traits, and patterns of motivation which
induce adequate performance in the hierarchical division of labor.
These characteristics, however, are not conducive to a healthy
psychic development or personal liberation. Therefore, if schools
promote "the intrinsic needs of individuals for growth", as mature
adults the students will not find a place in the labor market. And
conversely, if personal growth (as Bowles and Gintis understand it)
is not cultivated, students will stand a better chance to find a
place in the market.
Other liberal theorists, whom Bowles and Gintis call
representatives of "the technocratic" version of liberalism, are
susceptible to the same criticism. They equate growth with
improvement in cognitive and psycho-motor skills, claiming that
these skills are rewarded economically by increased employability.
A detailed examination of non-cognitive criteria affecting employ-
ability, however, shows that even this adaptation of liberal
theory
is not successful, since those most advanced in cognitive
and motor
skills are not in fact proportionately rewarded. But
their modifi-
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cations cannot save Dewey's argument.
Dewey's error lies in characterizing the social system as democra-
tic, whereas in fact the hierarchical division of labor is
profoundly totalitarian. Moreover, his central thesis as to the
"naturality" and intrinsic growth orientation of education is
untrue under capitalism whether it be laissez faire or that of
the corporate liberal. Dewey's view requires that work be seen
as a natural extension of "play", whereas alienated work in the
corporate capitalist economy is the negation of all intrinsically
motivated activity including play.
If the reply is made that Dewey knows that the present
economic order is not democratic and that growth in any socially
significant sense is often frustrated, but that there is no reason
to suppose that some movement may not be made in the direction of
democracy, Bowles and Gintis reply that he fails to "locate" the
problem properly. Dewey is said to attribute the failure of reform
to the poor performance of individuals or to misunderstanding which
is capable of intelligent correction. But Bowles and Gintis insist
that the problem is "systemic" in the sense that no mere modification
short of revolution could enable the present system to operate in the
interest of significant personal freedom and growth.
It can only be inferred from such a response as this that
5
they view "capitalism" in logical rather than descriptive terms.
It seems to refer, rather, to a set of logical conditions
which are
reflected in a social system of centralized power and
efficient
management, so that It could only be theoretical; "In
corporate
capitalist society the social relations of production
conform.
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by and large to the 'hierarchical division of labor' characterized
by power and control emanating from the top downward through a finely
graduated bureaucratic order."
An assessment of their criticism. In this article Bowles and Gintis
select from Dewey's writings what appear to be references to three
functions of schooling, translate the references to terms that Dewey
did not, and probably would not, have used, and then claim that the
three functions are contradictory. The contradiction, however, is
mot in Dewey's work but in their translation.
From the summary of Dewey's argument above, it is clear that
what they have selected are not functions of schooling but of
society itself, of which the economic system is only a part. School-
ing is formal education related to a level of culture reflected by
the development of literacy. Its functions as stated by Dewey were
to simplify, purify, and to balance the cultural heritage in such a
way as to minimize the adverse effects of social divisions. No attempt
is made to show that these functions which Dewey assigned to schooling
are contradictory.
Education is distinguished from schooling by Dewey as being
incidental or informal in the sense that it is the transmission of
culture not as an intentional act but as a bi-product of activity
pursued for other reasons. He looked forward to a day when all social
institutions may come to recognize the overriding importance of the
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educational significance of their activity.
Nevertheless, he was clear that at present the major part of
education seemed to happen without a conscious agent either personal




however, cannot be treated as purposes. The term
"capitalism" is used by Bowles and Gintis to imply not only a function
but a conscious purpose, as if there were some organized group
directing activities in the interest of its own profit and social
control. At the same time "capitalism" is used as a term equivalent
to Dewey's "society". Just as the existence of society is assumed
to be an end in itself, and education is its transmission through
time, capitalism is represented as a self-perpetuating agency with
an educational system of social reproduction assuring its survival
through time.
Dewey uses the term "democratic" to describe the character-
istics of a society which is expanding in the sense of extending the
benefits of more varied and supportive social relationships to a
greater share of its members. Bowles and Gintis, however, equate that
function of expanded reproduction of society with the expanded
reproduction of capitalist economy. It is because of this change of
definition that they can argue that the integrative function of
schooling as integrating students into the capitalist
economy
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rather than into democratic society is contradictory to personal
development
.
Peter Clecak, in reviewing Diane Ravitch's criticism of
"reproduction" in Bowles and Gintis, says, "Ravitch assumes a
mechanical and simplistic reading of Marxian notions of 'reproduction';
she implies that the social order of capitalism simply copies itself
as if it were a series of photographs. Nor serious Marxist makes
such an assumption about change under capitalism although Bowles
and Gintis, it should be admitted, do write amateurishly about
reproduction
.
As far as the article under consideration here is concerned,
there does not seem to be adequate reason given to equate Dewey's
use of the term "society" with Bowles' and Gintis' "capitalism."
Dewey's is a broader concept intended to describe patterns of cultural
behavior rather than economic patterns of "capitalism." Dewey
explicitly distinguishes between societies that reproduce themselves
in a static form, as Bowles and Gintis seem to think capitalism does
(cf. "photographically"), from societies that do so in a democratically
developing way. Dewey's argument makes no connection between
democratic principles or personal growth and the transmission of
static societies, but it is precisely those societies that
are unlike
capitalism in Bowles' and Gintis' version for whom democratic
education
becomes a logical demand. It appears then that the
translation of
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Dewey s concept of "society" transmitting across generations a
growing capacity to adapt to more complex environments through
democratic education, into Bowles’ and Gintis’ "corporate capitalism",
reproducing itself through the social relations of production is
hardly an accurate equasion and provides no basis on which to attack
Dewey’s argument on the function of education.
A similar point is made in Robert Heilbronner ’ s critique
of Schooling in Capitalist America . He notes that while Bowles and
Gintis argue that "the economy produces people," that notion is a
"crucial weakness" of the book.
The weakness is that the economy does not produce people. It
produces food and clothing, entertainments and weapons. It is
society that ’ produces ’ clothes and people, and society is a
larger and vastly more complex concept than the economy. The
failure adequately to separate one from another is the most
serious deficiency of Bowles's and Gintis’ s analysis, a
deficiency that lessens the cogency of their criticism of
’capitalist' education and that vitiates their contention about
the possibilities of education in a socialist setting.
He observes that additional factors in society which the hypothesis
does not take into account are the democratic liberal polity of the
country and the social structure of bourgeois values. Heilbronner
suggests that rather than see education as the passive instrument
of a monolithic capitalism, as Bowles and Gintis seem to do, it could
be regarded as the mediator between the demands of the economy, polity,
and society.
With respect to the second function of schooling, equalization
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of opportunity, none of the passages in Dewey quoted by Bowles and
Gintis refer to schooling as having the function of promoting
equalization of opportunity for economic development. All of those
passages discuss equalization in social terms including economic
equality but certainly including a wider range of activities than
merely economic. To interpret equalization of economic opportunity
as what Dewey meant by the aim of schooling being "to provide
something like a homogeneous and balanced environment for the young"





The third "function" of schooling stated by Bowles and Gintis
was referred to variously as "personal" or "self-development",
"healthy psychic development or personal liberation," something that
satisfies "the intrinsic needs of the individual," or "the intrinsic
needs of the individual for growth." While Dewey may have used these
words in one context or another, together they do not reflect his
view of the individual or growth. As a matter of fact, they reflect
the view that he attacked as alienated in his own sense. He plainly
Insisted that there is no self-development apart from social
development, and certainly nothing that could be understood as
"intrinsic" needs apart from "extrinsic." What significance
Dewey
would attach to "personal liberation" is not clear,
except that it is
certain that it could not be separated from social
liberation.
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Bowles and Gintis have proposed, then, three "functions” for
schooling which are different from the concepts cited in Dewey's
writings as their counterparts. To the extent that there is a
contradiction, it lies in the way Bowles and Gintis have defined
capitalism as a system which cannot by definition serve a legitimate
interest of the laborer.
Dewey distinguished between education as informal and school-
ing as formal transmission of culture. He acknowledged the vastly
greater influence of informal education, although he continued in
most of his educational writings to use the terms education and
schooling interchangeably. He assumed that the institution of
schooling could be both funded by available political mechanisms
and yet remain independent enough of political control to maintain
valid educational aims. Perhaps the most poignant pages of
Democracy and Education
,
however, are the last two in the chapter
entitled "The Democratic Conception of Education" in which he noted
that schooling alone cannot effect social reform. He recognized
that the admirable aims of eighteenth century cosmopolitanism could
not be achieved without sponsorship by some political agency. Nine-
teenth century nationalism accepted the task only to subvert the
cosmopolitan goals. But this left genuine education_in the sense of
education committed to personal growth and social growth with the
dilemma of affirming the broadest social aims and requiring partisan
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political support for itself as a social program. "This contradiction
(for it is nothing less) between the widest sphere of associated and
mutually helpful social life, and the narrower sphere of exclusive
and potentially hostile pursuits and purposes exacts of educational
theory a clearer conception of the meaning of ’social' as a function
and test of education than has yet been attained. . . The ideal may
seem remote of execution, but the democratic ideal of education is a
farcical, yet tragic delusion, except as the ideal more and more
dominates our public system of education. It is this clearer
conception of "social" that he pursued in his work on social theory
in the 1920s and 1930s.
One may infer that since the social aim of genuine education
is larger than national, there ought to be an international agency
of administration which could transcend nationalistic divisions and
protect education from partisan interests. In The Public and Its
Problems Dewey did recognize the growing influence of mass communi-
cations and identified an international cultural order on which
educational values were to be based. His term for this international
order was "the Great Community." He did not, however, discuss the
implications of the international economic system related to the
Great Community.
Dewey has proposed, then, a conception of what education
could be in terms of cosmopolitan values, and left
open the question
of how such a conception may be institutionalized in a form of
schooling. His pragmatic suggestions for a "new education" were not
meant to foreclose the question of how such a conception could be
realized in terms of the social, political, and economic realities
of his or any future era. But he was convinced that the problem was
not too great for popular intelligence to solve.
As Joseph Feathers tone points out, however, Bowles and Gintis
are much closer to Dewey in one respect than other revisionists.^^
It is in their emphasis on schooling as reproducing social character.
While other revisionists appear closer to the anarchist tradition
in their rejection of schooling as having a legitimate interest in
shaping social character, Bowles and Gintis reflect an interest
similar to the concerns of nineteenth century educators that schooling
should be an experience that contributes to the creation of a
socially responsible character in children.
While their work sometimes represents the reproduction of
social character in the schools as the inevitable subjection of free
personalities to a ^jage labor mentality, and at others as the product
of the conflict between capitalism and opposing social forces, Bowles
and Gintis maintain that schools can and should contribute to the
formation of an autonomous and socially responsible individual
character. This is why they focus on the early twentieth century
preoccupation of schools with cognitive testing and vocational skill
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development as a distortion of the legitimate purposes of education.
In this respect they follow Dewey closely as he himself criticized
these developments at the time of their occurrence.
In summary, then, Bowles and Gintis argue from what appears
to be a doctrinnaire Marxist position, that since economic forces
are fundamental to an analysis of social change, Dewey was wrong in
making society rather than the economy basic to his view of education.
They felt justified in substituting "capitalism" for Dewey's concept
of society since to them social relations in general were secondary
to the social relations of production. Their theory of "reproduction"
was a contribution to our understanding of the relation of education
and the economy, but social relations, even if dependent in some
sense on economic relations, are not identical with them.
In response to criticism of their work, Bowles and Gintis
appear to have modified their position in some respects. They
disclaim, for example, a functionalist analysis of schooling, or
that there is any capitalist elite controling the actual outcome of
schooling. They now regard education as the arena of conflict in
which various social groups clash and arrive at some balance of class
interests. Although they acknowledge that ethnic, regional, and
racial divisions are significant social forces, they maintain that
it is the class character of these groups that is ultimately
important
for the redistribution of political power and economic resources.
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They admit that there are strong pressures for more democratic
political arrangements that often come from representatives of
priviledged classes like themselves.
In this shift of position from orthodox Marxism to a more
descriptive empirical analysis of education, they are acknowledging
a diversity of actual functions of schooling, and modifying their
prescriptive judgments about the direction of educational change.
For example, in discussing economic development in the Third World
nations, they do not seem to regard the integrative function of
schooling as contradictory to the aims of democratic equality, but
as factors to be balanced against one another very much as Dewey did
in his Democracy and Education . The implication seems to be that
their analysis of schooling as reproduction of the social relations
of production is a contribution to the democratic forces resisting
capitalism if, once the fact is exposed to public view, the power
of the elite to use schools for that end is weakened. Dewey viewed
himself as making the same kind of contribution to his generation.
But Bowles and Gintis, in their analysis of him as a representative
of classical liberalism, have mistaken an ally for an enemy.
CHAPTER V
JOHN DEWEY'S LIBERALISM AND THE REVISIONIST CRITIQUE
Introduction
The revisionists' attack on Dewey is based on their view of him
as a spokesman of liberalism. They view liberalism as a political
ideology responsible for many objectionable contemporary social
conditions, including the undemocratic character of public schooling.
They maintain also that Dewey's educational writings were to some
extent responsible for the plight of schooling, just as his social
views were responsible for the failure of contemporary political
reform. It is appropriate then to ask whether revisionists are
correct in their analysis of Dewey's views, and whether their
criticisms are directed at issues that he himself would have regarded
as central for his own social philosophy.
Insofar as Dewey took for himself the- title of liberal, and
intended to address the issue of the moral significance of politics,
economics, and education, it does seem that the revisionists are
addressing a primary concern of his social philosophy. There is an
implication in revisionist writers, however, that in the light of
the decline of liberalism today, the source of the decline must be in
1
the self-contradictory views of earlier liberal thinkers like Dewey.
Dewey's views, of course, were formulated in response to the circum-




context. How they are used in some later context is a matter of the
motives and interpretation of others. It may be asked whether there
was ever a similarity of circumstances of his day that threatened
the same decline, and whether he recognized and responded to that
possibility in his analysis of liberalism. Although his revisionist
critics suggest that there were similar issues that he responded
to in a conservative manner, focusing as they do on his early writings
and on references taken without attention to his general social theory,
an overview of his work on social philosophy from 1927 to 1939 when he
did his major work on the subject shows that his formulation of
liberalism was directed principally against the conditions of class
conflict and economic inequality that are the concern of the
revisionists
"Liberalism**
There is some ambiguity in the way the term **liberalism** has
been used. Most writers on the subject recognize at least two major
types . Some commentators like Guido de Ruggiero say that when
liberalism succeeded in achieving political power, it was forced to
change its character to confront those who challenged it from the
2
lower levels of the political order. Hence, a more conservative
variety developed in contrast to an earlier more idealistic type.
Others, like Vernon Farrington, see varieties of liberalism
that
emphasize conflicting values like laissez faire liberalism,
seeking
99
economic freedom, and a Rousseauesque variety, emphasizing egalitarian
democracy for the economically oppressed.
Dewey also understood liberalism as derived from two historical
traditions. The first he called the religious, humanitarian tradition
in England, which sought social reform to improve the welfare of the
factory workers and the urban poor. The second tradition was that of
promoting the growth of industry and trade, as based on the ideas of
Adam Smith, and referred to as laissez faire liberalism.
From the very beginning, Dewey argues, there was an "inner split"
in liberalism. While the humanitarians were not averse to seeking
government help, the laissez faire group sought restriction of
government activities. While on the European continent the latter
variety of liberalism flourished, in the United States liberalism was
dominated by the humanitarian type. The Progressive movement in
principle at least was so motivated in promoting numerous pieces of
social legislation. Other liberals labeled these efforts "radical" or
"communist", but Dewey himself saw nothing revolutionary in the past
history of liberalism. He claimed.
As a matter of fact, up to this time (1935) in this country political
liberalism has never attempted to change the fundamental conditions
of the economic system, or to do more than ameliorate the estate
in which the mass of human beings exist. For this reason, liberalism
at present is under more violent attack from radicals than from
conservatives. In the mouth of radicals, liberalism is a term of
hissing and reproach.^




Radicals failed to appreciate an important difference in the
meaning of "liberty" for the two branches of liberalism. The laissez
faire liberals meant by liberty the freedom of the individual to rise
to the top of the economic system as it then existed. The humanitarian
branch argues "that liberty is something that affects every aspect and
phase of human life liberty of thought, of expression, of cultural
opportunity, and that it is not to be had, even in the economic
sphere, without a degree of security that is denied to millions by the
present economic system."^
The future of liberalism for Dewey was in doubt because it had
not responded to the more radical demands for economic justice.
There is, accordingly, no doubt in my own mind that laissez faire
liberalism is played out, largely because of the fruits of its
own policies. Any system that cannot provide elementary security
for millions has no claim to the title of being organized in
behalf of liberty and the development of individuals.
His perception at this time (1935) was that if "humane liberalism"
were to survive at all, it would have to deal seriously with the
means of attainment of social reform. "At present those means lie
in the direction of increased social control and increased collec-
tivism of effort. . . liberalism must become radical in the sense
that instead of using social power to ameliorate the evil conse-
quences of the social system, it shall use social power to change
the system."^
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The term "social power", of course, raises the question of
political power and the radical claim that political violence is the
exercise of that "social Power". Yet, Dewey argues, "Liberalism,
both by its history and by its own nature, is committed to democratic
g
methods of effecting social change." He contends that men cannot be
forced to be free. Violent revolution is a short-cut that would be
self defeating of democratic ends, as he argues it has been in Russia
and Italy. "Liberty is the means as well as the goal, and (that)
only through the development of individuals in their own voluntary
cooperation with one another can the development of individuality be
m9
made secure and enduring."
There is a connection in Dewey's view between humane liberalism
and radicalism. Laissez faire liberalism, he says, thinks of
economic structures as if they were natural laws, as though the
existing economic system were only something to be accommodated and
not changed. By contrast humane liberalism is committed to the idea
of "historic relativity" in that it regards both the concepts of the
individual and society, and its social and economic structures, as
in transition. "Experimentalism" is the method that humane
liberalism
recommends to guide the transformation in an appropriate direction





It follows (finally) that there is no opposition in principle
between liberalism as a social philosophy and radicalism in
action, if by radicalism we signify the adoption of policies which
bring about drastic instead of piecemeal changes. . . These
changes have been so tremendous in the last century, yes, in
the last forty years, that it looks to me as though radical
methods were now necessary. 10
Nevertheless, since liberalism is concerned with the intelligent
formation and execution of social policies, it opposes those forms
of radicalism that suggest violent overthrow of existing institutions.
With respect to the radicalism of Mussolini and Marx, he argues,
"In the degree in which mere force is resorted to, actual consequences
are themselves so compromised that the ends originally in view have
in fact to be worked out afterward by the method of experimental
intelligence
.
At the same time Dewey is not blind to the use of force by
others than the radicals, nor was he unaware of schools as coercive
institutions in their effect on the young. "I do not wish to be
understood as meaning that radicals of the type mentioned have
any monopoly on the use of force. The contrary is the case. The
reactionaries are in possession of force not only in the army and the
police, but in the press and the schools. Therefore the end of
humane liberalism was to emphasize the relation of "the economic state
of affairs to the extension of cultural resources to the whole
population" and to urge more urgent and intelligent change in
the
economic order to promote cultural equality.
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A conspicuous feature of Dewey’s treatment of liberalism was
his care with terminology and his concern to examine and .redefine
the terms of his argument that could lead to self-contradiction.
It is a failure to note these redefinitions and distinctions that
seems to lead to much of the innacuracy of revisionist criticism of
him.
For example, a major redefinition of Dewey's has to do with
individuality and common good or general welfare. While traditional
understanding tends to define these terms as polar opposites, Dewey
argues that ideas such as common or general need
do not mean a sacrifice of individuality; it would be a poor
kind of society where members are personally underdeveloped.
It does not mean the submergence of what is distinctive, unique,
in different human beings; such submergence would produce an
impoverishment of the social whole. Its proper analogue is
not a physical division, but taking part in a game or conversa-
tion, in a drama, in family life. It involves diversification,
not sameness and repetition.
It is this possibility, of building social arrangements that could
enhance individual growth and satisfaction that does not seem to
have been addressed by his revisionist critics, except to dismiss it
as empty rhetoric.
A further clarification is made with respect to the idea of
equality. Just as Dewey suggests that democracy has been reduced in
much of the discussion to a procedural concept from a moral one, he




It does not mean sameness; it is not to be understood quan-
titatively, an interpretation which always ends in ideas of
external and mechanical equality.
. . When there is an equation
in his own life and experience between what he contributes to
the group activity and experience and what he receives in
return, in the way of stimulus and enrichment of experience,
he is morally equal. . . Each individual is incommensurable
as an individual with every other in that it is impossible to
find an external measure of equality.
This is not to argue against economic equality, but to put it into
a larger context. Economic equality is a question not only of
monetary resources but cultural and social resources.
As far as political and economic equality is concerned, first
Dewey observed that "Most political issues of the present arise
out of economic conditions. They have to do with the distribution
of wealth and income, the ownership and control of property." Since
this is so, the first step in remedying the situation is to publicize
the true nature of the case. "The recognition by the general public
of their central position (i.e. economic issues) in political theory
and action would clear the air and make honest differences of
conviction more to the point and more fruitful."
His concern for equality in economic terms was discussed under
a section headed "Four Theories of Just Distribution" in his Ethi
cs.
There he acknowledged and rejected existing methods and views of
redistribution of wealth and, citing contemporary statistical
evidence
for unequal distribution of income, calls for an allotment
to every
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citizen beyond mere subsistence levels with incentives for public
service. Public schools have made education available to everyone
without giving "superior advantages to members of certain social or
economic classes", he believed. So, he reasoned, "if we should apply
the same principle to economic distribution, it would insist upon a
minimum that would not only prevent actual starvation, but would in
any country of abundant wealth make possible the necessities and some
of the comforts of present civilization."^^ Such redistribution
was not to leave the wealthy in possession of a disproportionate share,
however. He insisted that "the principle that every man who receives
should make a contribution is fundamental. .
In discussing the future of capitalism he says that Russia and
Italy were the first major attempts to move beyond capitalist
political economy. Both seem to have sacrificed a great deal of
individual liberty, but were worth watching to see if such defects
could be remedied. Regarding the United States, he says.
The extreme individualism of laissez faire , with competition as
the only regulator of the economic process, has been shown to
be no longer tolerable under present conditions. . . The
necessities of public welfare, and of the large numbers who
are economically in the status of pedestrian, require the
supremacy of an authority which aims at justice, not merely
as keeping order while the contestants fight it out, but as
revising the rules of a contest in the interest of a common
good when this is made necessary by the changed conditions
of an economic life.l®
It is true that Dewey did not see beyond what he called
"a
He believed that capitalism had producedmodified capitalism".
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great wealth, and that it had become important to the people who
lived under that system. Although the system had notorious deficien-
cies, they were not so great that they could not be corrected.
Dewey’s liberalism consisted notin his support for laissez
faire capitalism which he attacked repeatedly, but in his concern for
humane liberalism which he helped to create and whose social
legislation he facilitated. He saw "capitalism" itself as a
perversion of the economic system which could be corrected. It is
apparent that he could not conceive of an economic system that was
not capitalist and yet was capable of satisfying the material needs of
the nation’s population. Nevertheless, it was not the culturally
destructive features of the system that he valued, but its contribution
to social and cultural development.
Sidney Hook reports that there were two respects in which
Dewey included in his own philosophy ideas from the socialist
movement. One was the controling nature of economic conditions that
brought the United States into World War I. The other was that
although he believed prior to 1929 that experimental tinkering with
money, credit, tariffs, regulation of monopolies, etc., might serve
to provide for the basic needs of citizens for security, employment,
and a decent standard of living; early in 1929, even before the
market crash, he acknowledged that piecemeal reform was inadequate.
There must be wholesale economic planning.
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His views of the possibility of social reform through the
reform of schooling changed in a similar way. Although at first he
thought that changes in educational practice would have reforming
effect on society at large, he later came to see schools as controlled
by institutional relations outside of education. He says that it is
true that democratic countries have ’’exaggerated the educative office
19
of a special instrument, the schools.” They were the product of a
divisive individualism and promoted socially destructive attitudes.
Although they had a laudable purpose,
the schools, like other agencies, had been laid hold of by
strong minorities, and used to subvert their own ends. The
studies which have been made of the factors which influence
school administration and instruction in large centers leave
out what was said about the suppressive influence of powerful
minorities. . . Schools have been accommodated in a passive way
to existing industrial conditions instead of being employed
to wrest humane culture from them. 20
Consequently, Dewey did not ultimately conceive of schools as a
source of social reform, except insofar as they may through the
agency of far sighted teachers and administrators, contribute to
the building of attitudes that may accept and even demand changes
in the present social order. The means of change, however, seem to
be political and economic institutions. World War I and the
Depression were evidence of need for such change.
Revisionist Views of Liberalism
As might well be expected, critics of liberalism tend to
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characterize it in a way that contrasts more sharply with their own
views. With a concept as broad and as comprehensive as liberalism,
it is easier to caricature than to do justice to its wide range of
meanings. The revisionists have presented a more conservative view
of liberalism than is represented by those who actually claim the
title of liberal, and have failed to respond to the liberalism that
was particularly true of Dewey. Had they been more careful to
respond to the social views that he actually held, they would have
found that his liberalism was not the status, authoritarian, racist,
capitalist version they suggest, but a variety that affirmed many of
the values that they themselves hold.
A look at the recent criticism of liberalism may suggest more
precisely where the problems with liberalism lie, and where in
Dewey to look for the antecedents which the revisionists are concerned
to identify.
Jerome Mileur in his Liberal Tradition in Crisis gives some
21
historical background for the problems of liberalism today. The
great achievement for liberals in political terms was the social
legislation of the New Deal era. It was put together with the
coalition of several groups, including Southerners, farmers, labor,
blacks, and intellectuals. The rationale for the coalition
was the
liberal philosophy that Dewey among others articulated in
his





After the early success of the Roosevelt years, the coalition
broke down, and the character of political liberalism changed. Prior
to the New Deal there was a cooperative relationship between liberalism
and the political left, as exemplified by the good relations between
the New York teachers’ union and the Communist Party. After the
second World War the United States' reaction against Russia led to
a transformation of liberalism that drove it toward the right, and
severed its connections with the left. The political left, Mileur
argues, was suppressed from the time of McCarthy to the Viet Nam war.
But it reemerged as an opponent of liberalism, rather than in its
former role as a collaborator.
It is from the Viet Nam era that the most important criticism
of liberalism comes. The criticism is that liberalism suppressed
dissent, and cut itself off for two decades from reformist
elements of its own constituency. It had allied itself with
established political and economic arrangements and had no program
to promote the ideals that it had classically upheld. Because it
could not manage to control inflation, the economic gains of
those
whom it had raised to middle class status through New Deal
programs
were threatened, and they turned conservative.
It is from this Viet Nam period that the revisionist
criticisms




libertarianism or preserving traditional moral views, is strongly
influenced by the attack on liberalism from the left. They indict
liberalism for flirting with totalitarianism, abandonning the
popular will, concealing the class struggle, supporting the establish-
ed economic structure, and incorporating schools in preserving the
status quo.
The revisionists tend to portray Dewey as if he were a liberal
in the sense of the 1940s or 1950s when in fact his liberalism was
far more radical than they would acknowledge. When they refer to
his more radical positions, it is always by way of a concession, as
if Dewey were vacillating or uncertain of his own views. In fact,
the revisionists’ espousal of ideological historiography has made
them present a caricature of Dewey not informed by what Dewey said
and did so much as by their own views of liberalism in the 1960s.
It may yet be asked, however, how could liberalism go from
what it was in Dewey's day to what it became in the 1960s. What was
there in Dewey's thinking that may have foreshadowed the alienation
of the left in later liberalism? Some light on this issue may be
shed by examining Dewey's treatment of Marx in Freedom and Culture
in which Dewey makes his most extended comments on Marx.
In Freedom and Culture Dewey attacked Marx and Marxism
primarily for claiming to offer a scientific method when in fact the
theory is a systematic application of metaphysical principles derived
Ill
from Hegel. ’*Marx saw in the Hegelian dialectic a principle which,
when it was given an economic interpretation, provided a sure basis
for a science of social changes, while at the same time furnished the
revolutionary movement a supreme directive for its practical
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activities. He regarded this as pre-scientific in its emphasis
on necessity and on a single comprehensive law while contemporary
science meant acknowledgement of probability and pluralism of theory.
Marxism, then, could not be reconciled with Dewey's view of the
experimental nature of science.
The theoretical absolutism he saw as more than a methodological
error. "Absolute principles are intolerant of dissent, for dissent
from 'the truth.' is more than an intellectual error. It is proof of
23
an evil and dangerous will." The rejection of democratic procedure
by the Stalinists seemed to him a fulfillment of the Marxist methods
as well as a consequence of the Marxist reduction of psychological
phenomena to economic forces.
The fact is that Marx and every Marxist after Piim unconsciously
assumes the existence and operation of factors in the constitu-
tion of human nature which must cooperate with, 'external'
economic or 'material' conditions in producing what actually
happens. Explicit recognition of th^^e factors would give the
theory a different practical slant.
Two general responses have been made to Dewey's treatment of
Marx and Marxism by Sidney Hook and Jim Cork. The first is that
Dewey did not distinguish between Marx and Marxism, and his criticism
of Marx is colored strongly by the work of Marxist interpreters of
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Dewey’s own day. He was especially distressed at Stalin’s policies,
and remained unresponsive to colleagues like Hook who urged him to
reconsider his views of Marx.
The second point made about Dewey’s treatment of Marx is that
an analysis of Marx’s and Dewey’s works indicates that they are both
compatible and complementary. Hook says:
Leaving aside certain secondary differences of terminology, it
seems to me that were realistic Marxists prepared to submit
their methods of achieving democratic socialism to serious
scientific criticism, and were Dewey prepared to work out a
more detailed program of political action with reference to
the social."and economic relations, their positions would
converge on a set of common hypotheses leading to common
activity.
Later writers like Richard Bernstein in Praxis and Action have
pursued this line of thought, but it seems correct to say that
Dewey did reflect in his treatment of Marx the tendency of liberalism
26
to separate itself from left wing social theory. Dewey, himself,
however, supported many of the programs for which the leftists worked,
and opposed the so-called liberals who suppressed dissent form the
left. He campaigned actively for Norman Thomas, the socialist
condidate for president, and opposed the Roosevelt New Deal as not
radical enough.
In summary, the revisionists draw on a view of liberalism
taken from the 1940s and 1950s which had become more conservative,
and may legitimately be accused of responsibility for the social
problems of the 1960s which the revisionists condemned. Their
attack
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on Dewey, however, is based on an error of equating Dewey's liberalism
with that of a later era. Had they examined his social views in
their historical context, they would have found him much closer to
the position which they hold themselves.
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APPENDIX I
"Industrial Democracy" in Dewey
In a biography of Dewey written in 1939 for Paul Arthur Schilpp's
The Philosophy of John Dewey
,
the authors, Dewey's three daughters,
refer to Dewey's comment about "democracy becoming Industrial".
Referring to the lectures. The Ethics of Democracy, they say.
The most significant statement in the address, from a present
day point of view, is that political democracy is impossible
without economic and industrial democracy. But this statement
should not be taken to have its present meaning. Its immediate
source was probably Henry Carter Adams, a colleague in political
economy, who frequently pointed out the desirability and
probability of a development in economic life paralleled to
that which had taken place in politics, from absolutism and oli-
garchy to popular representation.^
No further comment is made in the biography, and the implication is
that Dewey's comment is not to be taken as an indication that he had
and more detailed views on the subject at this point in his career.
In the context of the statement about democracy becoming industria]
,
Dewey gives his interpretation of the Platonic idea of government, that
each individual realizes the ideal of his own personal development as
he interacts with the social and political community. Democracy,
although Plato did not realize it, is the actual working out of this
ethical and political ideal.
Democracy holds that the ideal is already at work in every
personality, and must be trusted to care for itself. . .Democracy
means that personality is the first and final reality. It admits
that the full significance of personality can be learned by the
individual only as it is already presented to him in objective
form in society; it admits that the chief stimuli and encourage-
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ment to the realization of personality come from society; but
it holds, none the less, to the fact that personality cannot
be procured for anyone, however degraded and feeble, by
anyone else, however wise and strong. It holds that the spirit
of personality dwells in every individual, and that the choice
to develop it must proceed from the individual.^
This view of social and political institutions having as their
aim the promotion of the growth of individual personality is then
"illustrated” by the notion that "democracy must become industrial,"
or "a democracy of wealth is a necessity." The objection that is
commonly raised to this idea, says Dewey, is that a simple numerical
division of wealth and redistribution would ne no effective solution.
But he responds that he does not mean the merely numerical division
of wealth. ""What is meant in detail by democracy of wealth,"
he says, "we shall not know until it is more of a reality than it is
today." At any rate, however, it means that industrial relations be
made subordinate to human relations, "that industrial organization
be made to serve a social function;" industrial relations "are to
become the material of an ethical realization; the form and substance
of a community of good (though not necessarily of goods) , wider than
any now known: that is, the family, largely in its best examples, and
the state somewhat, though in a less degree, mean unity of purpose
and interest; so economic society must mean unity of interest and
m3purpose
.
In a review entitled "Creative Industry" in 1918, Dewey comments
135
favorably on a book entitled Creative Impulse In Industry: A
Proposition for Educators by Helen Marot.
She lays chief stress on the importance of such conditions and
methods as will give each student-worker personal experience
in the administrative control of the processes of production
and marketing. Here, as she rightly points out, is the
greatest field for adventure and creative impulse. Only as
the modern society has at its command individuals who are trained
by experience in the control of industrial activities and
relationships, can we achieve industrial democracy, the
autonomous management of each line of productive work by those
directly engaged in it. Without such democratization of
industry, socialization of industry will be doomed to arrest
at the stage of capitalism, which may give the average laborer
a greater share of the material rewards of industry than he
now enjoys, but which will leave him in the same condition
of intellectual and moral passivity and perversion as that
in which he now lives.
Although at several places in his work on ethics Dewey discusses
the importance of economic life for social and political behavior,
he does not describe specific political programs for the implementa-
tion of industrial democracy. In his 1908 (and 1932 revision) of
his Ethics
,
he describes, with his co-author Tufts, numerous
"unsolved problems" of industrial capitalism, such as private pro-
perty, mechanization of industry, labor unions, corporations, etc.,
as well as theories of redistribution of wealth. All of these topics
he regards as in transition. He sees his ethical views of industrial
democracy as a set of principles meant to guide those who would move
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